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This study offers an explanation of why voters repeatedly choose leaders who came to 
power democratically at some point but will not abandon it when they ought to. Research 
shows leaders will employ any and every mechanism to remain in power, from restricting 
liberties to turning to violence as a method of repressing dissidence yet voters continue to 
vote them back into power. Why? Through an examination of the current situations in 
Venezuela, Turkey and Russia, the thesis reveals that economic performance provides the 
key explanation. If the country provides welfare to its citizens, they will be willing to 
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                                        INTRODUCTION 
The last twenty-five years of the past century were unsettled in political terms. A 
significant number of countries in seven different regions in the world evolved towards 
more open, liberal or less repressive regimes, and by extension, changed the political 
landscape in general. Whereas the causes, pace and shape of these transitions varied 
considerably, at least several of those countries in each region shared a common shift 
from dictatorships towards liberalization, and in many cases, democratization. Such was 
the fluctuation that the process was embraced by Western countries as the inexorable 
route towards the implementation of democratic regimes. In other words, it was widely 
assumed that democratic systems would eventually materialize in those countries. 
However, reality has proved otherwise. Many of those states have settled somewhere in 
the middle, continuing to display characteristics of both authoritarian and democratic 
regimes. Because reality does not correspond to the employed democratic lens to study 
those regimes, the resulting understandings are, not only biased, but incorrect.1  
These countries share both democratic and authoritarian features. On the one 
hand, they celebrate competitive elections but on the other, these are held on an uneven 
playing field, which reduces the opposition’s chances to win them. In fact, the opposition 
is sometimes too weak to present itself as a real alternative. Media plays a very important 
role and therefore, the administration’s efforts to control and censor it are significant. In 
many cases, there is widespread corruption that enlarges the gap between the incumbents, 
and large parts of the population which live in poverty. This bleak overview gives reason 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (January 2002) 
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for voters to share a sense of hopelessness regarding change and therefore, indirectly 
support the regime in power.  
Following the last point, this thesis asks why voters continue to support leaders 
that were elected democratically at some point but who will not follow the rules and 
leave power when they ought to. At times, leaders employ virtually every available 
means to avoid leaving office. They will repress any form of dissidence and ban protests 
by employing violence if necessary. They will restrict liberties and enhance repression. 
Some leaders will even amend the Constitution in case the document establishes limits on 
the number of terms the president can run. These regimes, because they normally share a 
history of corruption, tend to have economic swings, which only contribute to general 
dissatisfaction among the population. However, even in cases where there have been 
significant episodes of dissidence, citizens in polls show the intention of reelecting those 
leaders or directly do so in the upcoming elections. Such a puzzle is what constitutes the 
research question of this study. Whereas there are several features that arguably help 
these autocratic leaders to keep in power such as the aforementioned, the key is long-term 
economic growth. As long as the economy runs well for a sustained amount of time, 
voters will disregard other significant factors such as the absence of certain liberties, 
corruption, and lack of free press and justice.   
 
• Literature review 
One of the most noteworthy aspects in the study of states which are neither 
dictatorships nor fully democratic, is how many names have been used to identify them. 
The nuances between such labels are far from clear and hence contribute to a sense of 
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overlap and accumulation of terms while trying to explain the same or very similar ideas. 
For example, Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way define competitive authoritarian 
regimes as those in which there is electoral manipulation, abuse of state resources, unfair 
media access and varying degrees of harassment and violence that skew the playing field 
in favor of incumbents. 2  The authors consider that those regimes fall under the 
categorization of hybrid regimes given that they share both democratic and authoritarian 
features. Larry Diamond agrees with them by using the same term for those systems that 
present the form of an electoral democracy “but fail to meet the substantive test, or do so 
only ambiguously.”3 Similarly, Matthijs Bogaards acknowledges the proliferation of 
adjectives and calls on the necessity of specifying certain terms.4 Among them, he refers 
to delegative democracy, a concept coined by Guillermo O’Donnell, which refers to a 
minimally democratic system which lacks from horizontal accountability.5 Bogaards also 
emphasizes Zakaria’s conceptualization of illiberal democracy, in which the electoral 
component is also present but where civil liberties are restricted.6 Other scholars have 
worked on these regimes, which they refer to as defective democracies. In them, there is 
an effective democratic electoral regime but the state is unable to provide the necessary 
freedom and equality, as well as horizontal control by civil society that ought to be 
present for the realization of fully free and fair elections.7  
Finally, Andreas Schedler coins the term electoral authoritarianism to designate 
those regimes that have established a democratic image, including the celebration of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 3. 
3 Larry Jay Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (April 2002): 22 
4 Matthijs Bogaards, “How to classify hybrid regimes? Defective democracy and electoral 
authoritarianism,” Democratization 16, no. 2 (April 2009). 
5 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 5 no. 1 (January 1994) 
6 Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs 76 no. 6 (November/December 1997) 
7 Wolfgang Merkel et al., Defekte Demokratie: Band 1: Theorie (Germany: Springer, 2003) 
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regular competitive elections, but at the same time exercise authoritarian practices.8 
According to Schedler, the playing field is so uneven, due to systematic and profound 
violations of the principles of freedom and fairness that elections actually serve as an 
instrument for the incumbents rather than as a democratic tool.9 These systems allow a 
certain margin for an opposition to run in minimally competitive conditions – even if they 
will not win the elections they will get a certain amount of votes and have some seats.10 
Importantly, however, definitional questions of regime type are not only academic but 
also practical in these countries: while the authorities will claim the system to be 
democratic or in the process to become so, the opposition denounces it as authoritarian.11 
Up until now, academics have approached these regimes mostly from the state or 
the electoral competitiveness perspective: what factors make these regimes unique and 
different from pure democracies and dictatorships, the dynamics of electoral 
authoritarianism, as well as how to define an uneven playing field in which the 
opposition agrees to elections to gain power.12 Attention has also been paid to parties’ 
and states’ strength, to the impact of opposition on such party strength, and to the 
possible coercive capacity of the latter.13 Questions have been posed regarding how 
elections constitute an element through which to establish legitimacy at home and abroad 
by allowing citizens to vote even if the means are unfair.14 Focusing on leaders, scholars 
have looked into how rulers stay in power while still holding elections that may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Andreas Schedler, ed., Electoral Authoritarianism. The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006),1.  
9 Bingham G. Powell. Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions. 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000).  
10 Schedler, 3. 
11 Ibid., 7.  
12 Schedler. 
13 Levitsky & Way, 62-64, 70-72. 
14 Vladimir Gel’man, “The Rise and Decline of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia,” Demokratizatsiya 
22, no. 4 (Fall 2014): 504-505.  
	   8	  
overthrow them in favor of the opposition, 15  and how incumbents act towards 
succession.16 Finally, academics have considered Western leverage and linkage in such 
regimes and their consequences.17 
Other theories look upon economic factors to explain the particularities of these 
systems. Among them, economic modernization theories hypothesize that competitive 
authoritarian regimes are more likely to democratize in societies with higher levels of 
education, more developed civil societies and larger numbers of middle and/or working 
classes. In other words, the authors argue that wealthier societies under these hybrid 
regimes are more prone to democracy than those that are less so.18 A second economic 
theory looks upon income inequality to argue that in those societies where the gap 
between the rich and the poor is higher, the redistributive demands of the lower classes 
are assumed to be greater and consequently, the elite resistance to democracy bigger 
too.19 Hence, democratization might be more probable in competitive authoritarian 
regimes where the income inequalities are lower. Finally, there is a third theory which 
focuses on economic performance by affirming that the system’s stability is highly 
related to economic growth. Whereas good accomplishments will expand resources 
available for patronage and public salaries, as well as to bolster public support, 
downturns and crises will have the opposite effects, thus undermining the regime. As a 
result, competitive authoritarian regimes where the economy works well should be more 
stable whereas those that do not perform well are subjected to a higher risk of collapse.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Bunce and Wolchik, 49-50.   
16 Levitsky & Way, 28-29.  
17 Ibid, 40-42.  
18 Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, “Endogenous Democratization,” World Politics 55, no. 4 (July 2003). 
    Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics 49, no. 2    
    (January, 1997).  
19 Carles Boix, Redistribution and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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However, there seems to be a gap regarding the citizens’ perspective and why 
they continue to vote for leaders that do not play by the democratic rules once they ought 
to leave power. Very briefly, Bunce and Wolchik touch on the question and argue that 
voters regard their preferences as useless. On the one hand, citizens consider that the 
incumbents will manipulate the results in their favor. On the other, not only is the 
opposition highly unlikely to win, but also, citizens perceive those parties as weak and 
divided, sometimes collaborators with the regime, and in favor of boycotting elections 
and therefore, not worth their vote.20 Nevertheless, such a broad statement generalizes 
without further investigating the voters’ preferences and choices. Moreover, because the 
opposition is characterized by not having equal access to state resources, boycotting 
elections may be a peaceful and quite effective means of showing disagreement with the 
states’ practices and undermining its legitimacy.21  
 While there are numerous theories about how organizing power to their 
advantage enables autocrats to stay in office, there has been much less focus on why 
citizens might want an autocrat to stay in office. One important exception is Beatriz 
Magaloni’s work on electoral authoritarianism in Mexico. Following what has been 
discussed above about a positive correlation between a well-functioning economy and a 
stable regime, Magaloni argues that the electorate in regimes where there has been a 
long-term and sustainable growth is quite likely to tolerate short-term economic crisis.22 
Although Magaloni focuses primarily on Mexico, I will argue that her theory could apply 
to other regimes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Bunce & Wolchik, 62. 
21 Staffan I. Lindberg, “Opposition parties and democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa,” Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies 24, no. 1 (2006).  
22 Magaloni, 20.  
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When looking at the economic performance of Venezuela, Turkey and Russia, her 
argument offers a compelling explanation for the continued electoral dominance of the 
ruling parties in those countries. On the one hand, oil in Venezuela has been an incredibly 
successful source of revenues and welfare for many years.23 Many lower-class people 
gained more with Chávez than they ever did in the previous decades. However, the 
current situation where oil prices seem to be in free fall are putting President Maduro in a 
dead end where drastic measures ought to be taken. And indeed, the situation has 
presumably crossed the limit of what Magaloni would call a short-term economic crisis 
given the dissident voices heard all over the country. In the case of Turkey where the 
AKP has been in power for more than twelve years, the rule is also applicable. The 
country’s economy has grown steadily during the past decade except for a serious 
downturn in 2009 following the world economic and financial crisis, which it has already 
left behind.24 Finally, Russia presents a very similar economic trend to the Turkish one.25 
Together with long-term economic growth, Magaloni mentions two other factors 
that need appear in these states for leaders to obtain mass support from the electorate. 
First, it is expected for the country to exercise vote buying and enforce “the punishment 
regime”: reward loyalties and simultaneously threaten to exclude the opposition voters 
and politicians from the clientelist regime. Secondly, Magaloni mentions electoral fraud 
and the use of force as a constituent element of these regimes.26  Nevertheless, while both 
features appear to be true in Venezuela and Russia, they do not take place in Turkey and 
consequently, only the first component, sustained economic growth, appears to be the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 http://data.worldbank.org 
24 The World Bank. Turkey’s GDP evolution. 	  http://data.worldbank.org 	  
25 The World Bank. Russia’s GDP evolution. http://data.worldbank.org  
26 Magaloni, 20.  
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answer to the question of why citizens continue electing political leaders who do not 
respect the democratic parameters through which they came to power. 
As will be discovered in the following pages, the literature on the Venezuelan, 
Turkish and Russian regimes has predominantly focused on the different characteristics 
that constitute the political systems and make them what they are, in some cases 
indirectly touching on the questions posed above. Thus, there have been studies on the 
patronage and clientelist system in Russia, inherited from feudal times and widespread 
today.27 The question on electoral fraud or at least on dubious fair elections was raised 
the last time Venezuelan voters went to the ballot box and in the case of Turkey, voters 
are very well aware that Erdogan is violating the rules by exercising power from the 
supposedly symbolic post of president. Hence, Magaloni’s variable of the long-term 
economic growth seems to apply to the study cases presented here, and indeed, will 
constitute the hypothesis of this project: if the country performs well economically for a 
sustainable amount of time, citizens are willing to overlook the lack of certain democratic 
tenets.  
Venezuela, Russia, and Turkey all have the figure of a strong man who appeals to 
the masses and, a priori, has widespread support. Whereas there are other factors that 
these countries have in common – examined here as potential explanatory variables – 
they are, in fact, very different regimes with quite diverse backgrounds and societies, but 
all sharing the competitive authoritarianism backbone. Such a mix places this study in the 
middle of what has been named Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) and Most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Geoffrey Hosking, “Patronage and the Russian State”, The Slavonic and East European Review 78, no. 2 
(Apr., 2000).  
Stephen K. Wegren and Andrew Konitzer, “Prospects for Managed Democracy in Russia”, Europe-Asia 
Studies 59, no. 6 (Sep., 2007).	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Different Systems Design (MDSD) approaches. In the former, the case studies are quite 
similar but differ in a crucial aspect whereas in the latter, the cases present very different 
factors but a striking similarity in one. And so, whereas patronage is common in 
Venezuela and Turkey, and Russia and Venezuela present large numbers of rural and 
poorer voters, respectively, there are other factors that make them quite different such as 
Islam, unique to Turkey. So far, a shared instability and a charismatic leader figure 
appear to be the most salient factors in common.  
Other features that may shape the voters’ preferences are the importance of 
patronage distribution and the control of resources. 28  There also seems to be a 
relationship between demography and voting standards. Data points at rural voters as 
being more pro-regime than those that live in urban areas.29 The same pattern appears in 
the case of the poor population, more likely to turn out to vote, and more pro-incumbents. 
Whereas these aspects are present in the three case studies analyzed here, not all of them 
are in every country, or else, there are other elements present. As an example, a 
patronage-based system clearly exists in Russia30 and Venezuela31 but not in Turkey. 
Similarly, Venezuela and Turkey share a largely polarized society and a military which is 
very present in the state’s affairs,32 something that does not appear to be true in the case 
of Russia. Thus, whereas the aforementioned factors presented in the table below are not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Lust-Okar 
29 Magaloni.  30	  Geoffrey	  Hosking, “Patronage and the Russian State,” The Slavonic and East European Review 78,  
no. 2 (Apr. 2000), pp. 301-320. 
31 Francisco Rodríguez and Adam J. Gomolin. “Anarchy, State, and Dystopia: Venezuelan Economic 
Institutions before the Advent of Oil.” Bulletin of Latin American Research 28, no. 1 (2009), pp. 102-121 32	  M. Hakan Yavuz,“The Politics of Fear: The Rise of the Nationalist Action Party  (MHP) in Turkey.” 
Middle East Journal 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002), pp. 200-221. 
Julia Buxton, “Venezuela’s Contemporary Political Crisis in Historical Context,” Bulletin of Latin 
American Research 24, no. 3 (2005), pp. 328-347.  
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to be dismissed in a study of voters’ behavior in these regimes, they are ultimately 
secondary to the question presented here: if sustained economic growth is provided, 
voters will be willing to elect their autocratic leaders and tolerate arguably non-
democratic tenets.  
 Venezuela Turkey Russia Similar / 
Different 
Polarized society X X  Different 
Significant military  X  Different 
Nationalistic parties. 
One identity 
 X X Different 
Patronage X  X Different 
Rural voters/parties. 
Poverty 
X  X Different 
Charismatic leader X   Different 
Authoritarian style X   Different 
Weak opposition  X  X Different 
Pro-government 
party “everywhere” 
  X Different 
Corruption. 
High levels of 
bureaucracy. 
X  X Different 
European Union  X  Different 
Religion at state 
level 
 X  Different 
Long-term 
economic growth 
X X X Similar 
Dependency on 
natural resources X  X Different 
 
	   14	  
In conclusion, there has not yet been a consistent study on the question of why 
voters continue to reelect leaders that do not follow the democratic parameters once in 
power. Questions have largely focused on the state and the incumbents’ dynamics to keep 
ruling but there is little information on the electorate’s behavior, except for Magaloni’s 
account. The thesis presented here will attempt to fulfill this vacuum through its study on 
the countries of Venezuela, Turkey and Russia, where the leaders have and are clearly 
violating the democratic rules and are still in power.    
 
• Case studies 
The selection of the countries of Venezuela, Turkey and Russia as case studies is 
not a banal choice. The three present questionably compatible factors with a fully 
democratic system. Despite being very different in ideological and political terms, they 
share many of the features examined above as potential explanatory variables and by 
extension, a common sense of instability. Furthermore, despite being located in different 
parts of the world and holding very different backgrounds, they present quite similar 
elements that enable them to be the object of this research. In particular, they share the 
figure of a strong man,33 a significant factor in understanding the elections’ dynamics in 
these countries. Secondly, the good economic performance of the three countries during 
the past decade, except for a significant episodic crisis in 2009 in Russia and Turkey, and 
one in Venezuela in 2011, offers an interesting occasion to study them according to 
Magaloni’s theory on the success of authoritarian electoral regimes if they perform well 
economically in the long-term.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The figure of a strong man in the case of Venezuela refers to Chávez, given that Maduro clearly does not 
have his predecessor’s charismatic appeal. 
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Other country features are unique to each of them, such as the effect of the EU 
rejection of Turkish membership, or one party almost equivalent to the state as it appears 
to be in Russia. However, the existing literature on these regimes and their leaders offers 
several pieces from the same puzzle that scholars have not attempted to put together 
trying to answer the question of why these political systems look the way they do. This 
gap is widened by the academics that have gone into the theory of authoritarian 
competitive regimes but have not really explored them case by case. Furthermore, as has 
been explained above, the perspective has always been that of the state and how it 
functions whereas not enough attention has been paid to citizens’ behavior in these 
countries and what their perceptions are. This thesis will focus on them and try to fill in 
that gap taking the economy and its positive growth as the first factor for voters to 
support an autocratic regime over time.  
 As has been mentioned, the three countries to be analyzed here have been largely 
studied in their idiosyncrasy without a particular focus on voters’ dynamics. First, during 
the 19th-20th centuries, the authorities in Venezuela did not even hold control of the whole 
territory. While the “caudillos” – a term used to define the political leaders – had a lot of 
power, the society had been historically decentralized. That may explain why a large 
percentage of the population felt such disaffection towards its politicians later on, not 
feeling identified with Chávez nor with the opposition.34 For its part, this opposition was 
significantly weak, united only in its dislike for the President. Indeed, Venezuela 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Julia Buxton, “Venezuela’s Contemporary Political Crisis in Historical Context,” Bulletin of Latin 
American Research 24, no. 3 (2005): 342.  
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presented a polarized society at the time of the elections when Chávez came to power,35 
which has very much continued until today. 
At the beginning of the last century, the system was largely patronage-based and 
it was considered normal that to hold a public office would ensure private gains.36 And 
so, the line between public and private became blurred37 in an equation where political 
institutions became equivalent to the state, also known as patronage. The immense state 
bureaucracy only enlarged the corruption figures.38 Moreover, the country faced poverty 
in such large numbers that the administration ensured loyalty by giving out property.39 
Chávez became widely renowned for his charisma, his authoritarian style,40 and his 
presidential decrees, an arguably common instrument during his rule. His military 
background – Chávez was an ex-colonel who participated in the 1992 coup – largely 
explains the support he had from the army,41 and presumably the aforementioned 
authoritarian ruling style. 
In the case of Turkey, the military has traditionally played an exceptional role for 
a democracy – the army has overthrown administrations when it considered that they 
were not working on behalf of the nation42 – by intervening or interfering in civilian areas 
and, by extension, in politics.43 Nationalistic parties have risen in approximately the last 
two decades, constituting themselves around the idea of one identity and consequently 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Buxton, 329-330.  
36 Francisco Rodríguez and Adam J. Gomolín, “Anarchy, State, and Dystopia: Venezuelan Economic 
Institutions before the Advent of Oil,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 28, no. 1 (2009): 110. 
37 Rodríguez y Gomolín, 117. 
38 Buxton, 336-337.  
39 Rodríguez y Gomolín, 112. 
40 Buxton, 330. 
41 Ronald D. Sylvia and Constantine P. Danopoulos, “The Chávez Phenomenon: Political Change in 
Venezuela,” Third World Quarterly 24, no. 1 (Feb., 2003): 72.  
42 Cengiz Çandar, “Atatürk’s Ambiguous Legacy,” The Wilson Quarterly (1976-) 24, no. 4  
(Autumn, 2000): 90.  
43 M. Hakan Yavuz, “The Politics of Fear: The Rise of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) in Turkey,” 
Middle East Journal 56, no. 2 (Spring, 2002): 201. 
	   17	  
dismissing and excluding the rest, especially the Kurds.44 As in Venezuela, society is 
largely oriented towards the ruling party – AKP, which stands for Justice and 
Development Party, its leaders and their policies.45 Concerns are mounting over the 
increasing authoritarian style of Erdogan, today President of the country, his attempts to 
control the opposition press, and how the country is losing its secularist identity and 
moving towards a more Islamist position, even at the expense of its traditional alliance 
with the West.46 The society’s polarization, together with the volatility of the party 
system, only reinforces the vicious circle of deepening the large tensions between the 
state and the population.  
Finally, Turkey presents a unique factor in comparison to Venezuela and Russia, 
which is membership of the European Union. Whereas large numbers of Turkish citizens 
positively considered the idea of joining the EU at the beginning of the process in the 
2000s, the ceaseless reform demands by the EU, with no corresponding positive action, 
has led to disillusion among large numbers of the population who do not regard Europe 
as their future anymore.47 Europe’s impact on Turkey has largely strengthened the role of 
civil society, which today participates in Turkish’s policies and politics towards reform 
and democratization.48 However, precisely because Turkey has largely evolved and 
transformed its state structures’ by looking to the European model in the twentieth 
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century,49 some scholars argue that the EU rejection of Turkey’s membership may halt 
Turkish achievements in enhancing its democratic project.50   
Finally, Russia is commonly regarded among scholars as one of those countries 
that is neither a complete democracy nor a dictatorship, although there is no consensus on 
how to exactly designate it either. Some academics have referred to it as managed 
democracy, meaning a political system where there is “political stability, elections are 
held but results are more or less foreordained, and serious political challenges to 
executive power are either absent or muted. Upheavals, spontaneity, and unpredictability 
are precluded.”51 Probably its most salient features are patronage and clientelism, which 
go back to the feudalist regime of the 15th century.52 Both systems evolved into the 
nomenklatura structure during the Soviet Union era, and the unofficial mutual exchange 
of goods and services practice that prevails in the country today.53 Thus, the distinction 
between public and private interests and goods is virtually non-existent, as is the case in 
Venezuela, since both are present in the concept of public service.54 An important factor 
in the Russian regime is rural voters. Because they comprise significant swing 
constituencies, and voter turnout there is larger than in urban areas, these groups have 
largely shaped the country’s politics.55  
Hence, whereas Venezuela, Turkey and Russia are incomparable countries in 
many aspects, with very diverse backgrounds that have led them to what they are today, 
the three share some factors that make them an interesting comparative study on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Ibid, 363.  
50 Ibid, 379. 
51 Wegren and Konitzer, 1025. 
52 Hosking, 301-302. 
53 Ibid., 319.  
54 Hosking, 312. 
55 Wegren & Konitzer, 1026.  
	   19	  
question of why voters continue electing their undemocratic leaders. All of them have 
gone through periods of long and sustained economic growth that have placed them at the 
core of the international community. Moreover, this advancement has arrived hand in 
hand with the presence of three strong men that have been in power for more than a 
decade and – except in the case of Venezuela because Chávez died – they clearly have no 
desire to abandon power.  
The choice of three case studies will allow the essay to carry out an in-depth 
analysis of each of them and simultaneously provide a wider scope for contextualization. 
Because the question posed here has not been addressed before, the conclusions of this 
thesis will constitute new theory. However, it is acknowledged that the selection of just 
three countries shall not assume an automatic generalization of the outcomes with states 
whose regimes are similar but these could present other non-democratic features such as 
the potential explanatory variables presented here. The cases have been selected 
according to the commonality of an authoritarian charismatic leader and consistent 
economic growth, recognizing all the differences in the three countries which make the 
study all the more compelling. This thesis argues that sustained good economic 
performance over time enables political leaders to adopt an autocratic ruling and still 
enjoy voters’ support.  
 
• Research design 
The three countries proposed here present several common elements, although not 
to all three cases, such as uneven playing field, patronage and clientelism, good economic 
performance, high power of the military as a state institution, high interference in politics, 
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weak opposition, high levels of state bureaucracy and widespread corruption, a polarized 
society, nationalistic parties, widespread poverty, a charismatic leader as the head of the 
state, authoritarian ruling style, and a strong state party. These potential explanatory 
variables are what at first have made possible the choice of Venezuela, Turkey and 
Russia for the purposes of this project. At the next level, the three countries are governed 
by politicians who were elected democratically but who subsequently have not followed 
the rules to leave power when they ought to and instead are employing all the necessary 
measures to stay in office. As has been explained above, until now focus has been placed 
on the leaders’ instruments to stay in power but attention has not been put on citizens’ 
behavior. This question will constitute the dependent variable of the project.  
The three states have had episodes of dissidence at some point in the last months 
– the Pussy Riot group in Russia, mass protests in Istanbul following the government’s 
intention to demolish Gezi park to construct a shopping mall in its place, and continuous 
demonstrations in Venezuela against the government, its policies and economic shortages 
– which have been strongly repressed by violent means: in the case of Russia by sending 
three of the group members to prison. And still, after the population showed its 
disagreement with the government in different ways, Putin and Erdogan have 
successfully played the game of switching from prime minister to president (and vice 
versa in the case of Putin), a theoretically symbolic position, while in practice keeping 
power and ruling the country. The apparent contradiction between dissident episodes and 
the leaders’ perpetuation in power is to be analyzed through the economic argument 
presented here: if there is economic growth, the population will weigh in its favor despite 
the lack of other important factors such as impartial justice or free media. 
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VENEZUELA: A spiral of populism, violent rhetoric and patronage 
 
“The Bolivarian Revolution is a non-democratic and hegemonic regime, with a 
totalitarian vocation, a Castro-Communist filiation and military profile, that seizes our 
liberties, pretends to control all the human life aspects, and forces us to subsist in social 
and economic conditions that denigrate the dignity of every Venezuelan.”56 
 
– Julio Borges, co-founder of Primero de Justicia, one of the main political 
parties in the opposition.  
 
Although Chávez died on March 5, 2013, President Nicolás Maduro, appointed by 
Chávez himself as his heir, has ruled Venezuela continuing his predecessor´s style and 
policies. Thus, for the purpose of this project, even if Chávez is the only politician not in 
power anymore from the three case studies included here, both leaders and periods will 
be analysed together due to their many continuities, such as the government’s aggressive 
rhetoric, its populist policies and its anti-Imperialism, among other factors. However, 
given the current challenges Maduro is facing that Chávez never did, questions will also 
be raised about the transcendence of the crisis: is it product of the circumstances that the 
country is going through or does the leadership play a role too?  
Hugo Chávez arrived in power in 1998 after winning the elections with 56.2% of 
the vote and a turnout slightly over 63% of the population. Despite his initial 
commitment to ensure a truly efficient democratic system in Venezuela – rampant 
corruption and patronage were the instruments which "managed" the country at the time – 
his presidency was characterized precisely by a return to those practices, a seizure of the 
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media and the justice system, undermining civil society and by all methods, preventing 
the formation of an effective, strong and real opposition to his government.   
Such a dismal picture would presume a population disenchanted towards its 
government but after fourteen years of a more than contested democratic rule, the streets 
were full of people mourning the loss of their leader in March 2013. Why? Why would 
the people continue electing a leader that clearly undermined civil liberties by crushing 
independent media, reformed the judiciary in order to ensure its loyalty, jailed opponents, 
and adopted an adversarial approach towards the United States and by extension all their 
allies, almost becoming an outsider except for relations with Cuba, Russia and Iran and 
some neighbours in Latin America?   
The answer is simple: the vast Venezuelan oil resources tied to the boom prices 
that lasted for decades enabled a patronage system where not only the elites became rich 
but millions of Venezuelans left poverty and became middle-class. As Magaloni accounts 
in her study of Mexico, if there is sustained long-term economic growth, the population 
will overlook other factors such as civil liberties or rights. After all, Chávez´s voters 
never achieved so much before and who would ensure that the opposition would keep the 
same practices? Nevertheless, the current economic crisis seems to be challenging the 
system´s pillars: if the structure is not sustainable anymore – as it seems to be by the 
mass protests and the long queues to buy basic goods – who ensures that the chavistas 
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• Venezuela: heir of the Punto Fijo Pact (1958)  
In order to understand the current political system in Venezuela, one ought to go 
back to the emergence of democracy in 1958. At this point the dictator Marcos Pérez 
Jiménez, in power since 1953, was overthrown and from it emerged what was called the 
Punto Fijo Pact. This agreement was devised as a governability tool which grouped the 
church, the military, the political parties – with the exception of the Communist Party – 
and civil society.57 The project guaranteed a set of basic rules for the political order to 
work and to ensure that the elected governments would not be overthrown.58 The 
President was the most important figure in the country with most powers concentrated in 
him. Private interests had a place at the state level: representatives were elected without 
being accountable to the electorate or even to the party, and the revenues’ redistribution 
came from the oil industry, not from taxation.59  Finally, it is important to note the high 
decentralization that characterized Venezuela until the 1920s by which the national 
authorities were little more than administrative structures which lacked control of the 
whole territory. The subdivision of the country into multiple regions allowed the 
emergence of the “caudillos” – regional and local leaders with a lot of power.  
 By 1978 the democratic system had achieved a certain degree of equilibrium with 
a stable two-party regime, a high degree of partisan identification, sustained economic 
growth, a huge trade surplus, and an efficient neo-corporatist arrangement of intra-elite 
bargaining.60 Only two years later, the first cracks began to appear. The two party-system 
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became highly criticized due to its lack of internal democracy, the citizens’ unrest 
appeared to be ubiquitous and businesses and labour unions were increasingly voicing 
their discontent against the government’s rule. Together with a seemingly stagnant 
economy after a long period of prosperity, the perspectives did not appear stable.61  
By 1989, the Punto Fijo system was losing authority following the drop of the oil 
prices and the absence of an alternative economic model that would have mitigated its 
effects. The populist conciliation system, based on the distribution of economic resources 
to the political elites and popular classes, was not sustainable anymore.62 In an attempt to 
keep order, the regime resorted to violence and electoral fraud which culminated in 
massively repressed anti-government riots in February of that year, known as the 
Caracazo. Estimates point at 400 hundred people killed and thousands injured.63 Hugo 
Chávez Frías, at the time a military colonel, was among the outraged at the use of 
violence against civilians. In 1992 he led an unsuccessful coup against the government 
for which he assumed responsibility on TV and wished the best for the country. This first 
public appearance as a brave and humble soldier was the first step of what would become 
his political career.64 For six years he honed his political figure until in 1998 he won the 
national elections with the support of civilian and left sectors. He initially began with the 
Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario (MBR), a military organization which would 
culminate in the political group Movimiento Quinta República (MVR), with Chávez as 
head.65 His electoral success could be identified as the capture of the population’s malaise 	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against the traditional elitist parties. In contrast, Chávez presented a new and inclusive 
political order that embraced the majority.66 Tony Blair, former British Prime Minister, 
defined his model for the transformation of the country as “The Third Way” – neither 
socialism nor capitalism.67 Nevertheless, due to Chávez’s involvement in the 1992 coup, 
many voices called on the illegitimacy of his participation in the 1998 elections, and 
hence, even when he won them, many of his opponents did not recognise the government 
as valid.68 As a consequence, the new government took power in the context of a 
polarized society.  
 
• A former colonel as president of the country 
In comparison to other authoritarian electoral regimes, Venezuela has been 
depicted as presenting a very particular feature which is the promotion of disorder.69 
Whereas other countries such as Saudi Arabia or Russia intend to have political 
legitimacy enforcing order, Venezuelan leaders do not work to stop lawlessness. The 
population feels intimidated through third parties – cases of thugs attacking oppositionists 
or citizens living in fear of random crime have been reported – and are consequently 
discouraged to take collective action against the government. It also produces discontent 
although not among the chavistas’ protected class.  
As soon as Chávez came to power in December 1998, he convened the National 
Assembly to draw up a new constitution which would be approved one year later by 71 
per cent of the population. The preamble defines the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela as 	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a “democratic, participatory and protagonist society”, a model that sought a high 
participation of the population in public affairs.70 The Constitution gives pre-eminence to 
international human rights treaties above domestic laws, a measure that brought about 
broad political support.71 The document establishes the possibility for the president to 
succeed himself although with a maximum of two terms in the presidency. It also says 
that the government may be abolished through a popular referendum in case it does not 
perform well.72 Nevertheless, Chávez´s critics considered the Constitution partisan and a 
“charter for dictatorship” – the document was drafted by an overwhelmingly pro-Chávez 
assembly.73 On this point, it is worth noting that the current opposition approves the 
document and its political strategy is based on it.74  
Chávez’s project was defined as the Bolivarian Revolution, in a tribute to Simón 
Bolívar’s role in the independence of Venezuela from the Spanish empire. Together with 
Bolívar, Ezequiel Zamora and Simón Rodríguez constituted the three pillars upon which 
the program was founded. As a whole, the three constituted an “entity” which embodied 
the values of social justice, freedom, the fight against a class-based oppression, and 
education for the masses, although adapted to the 20th century population’s needs.75 
Venezuela sought a place of its own in the global order and not to be subservient to the 
American interests or those of international institutions such as the IMF or the World 
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Bank. This has been one of the backbones of the new Venezuelan ideology, traditionally 
defined as anti-Imperialist.76  
It must also be pointed out how Chávez envisaged his democratic model to be 
more participatory than liberal.77 He intended to make citizens more involved in the 
decision-making processes in non-political spheres of the social life, instead of only 
participating through the holding of elections – the dominant political model in the world. 
With this purpose he promoted the creation of Bolivarian circles,78 cooperatives, social 
enterprises and communal circles during his first term (1999-2007).79 Upon his reelection 
in 2007, his model, defined as “21st century socialism” became a radicalization and 
reformulation of the Revolution. 
It is important to note that the reference to socialism only came with time. In fact, 
the Bolivarian Revolution rejected it since the movement’s maturation took place in the 
context of socialism’s collapse. Yet following the values of solidarity, justice, fraternity, 
liberty and equality, as they appeared in the electoral campaign of 2006, the new ideology 
became more specific in the attempted constitutional reform of 2007. The participatory 
democracy was now to be understood as based on “popular power”. In this second phase 
the government developed an immense network of community councils with 
spokespersons at the head of community-based organizations. However, this process of 
increasing the population’s participation in parallel led to a competition with and 
weakening of the local institutions and their representation.80 And so, despite the 1999 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Ibid.  
77 Canache, 98. 
78 The Bolivarian circles are political and social organizations of workers’ councils in Venezuela created 
under President Chávez for the promotion of the Revolution’s ideas.  
79 Ibid., 100. 
80 Canache, 100-101. 
	   28	  
democratic Constitution, Chávez’s presidency was marked by clearly unfair practices, a 
very antagonistic attitude towards the opposition and high peaks of instability. 
Nevertheless, the upgrade in the population´s quality of living due to the immense capital 
from the oil industry made them disregard such negative factors and continue supporting 
Chávez and his patronage practices.  
 
• Huge cash flows without real growth 
To begin with, the creation of the mechanisms that empowered the population 
constituted a politicisation of social programs for electoral purposes. The spectacular oil 
boom prices and the fact that Venezuela was the fourth biggest exporter in the world81 led 
to a huge amount of revenues which the administration largely invested in what were 
called the missions. Barely any money was saved or reinvested in the oil sector or in a 
diversification of the economy and it was the presidency itself which supervised the 
programs, instead of the local governments or the bureaucracy. Estimates have pointed at 
an increase in the funding of the missions programs of a 314 per cent in per capita 
terms.82 Such initiatives in health, education, and citizen mobilization were aimed at key 
sectors of the population, in many cases following political purposes such as to secure the 
loyalty of the beneficiaries, to bolster the support of the regime’s politicians, and the 
distribution of patronage and jobs to loyalists.83 As a result of the missions Chávez 
earned support from four key groups: those who received the social benefits, low-income 
classes mainly; those formally associated with the state – the bureaucracy in Venezuela 
reached to one out of every six citizens between 1958-1998 when party affiliation or 	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loyalty to AD and COPEI, the two ruling entities, meant a job at the state level, 84 (and 
the situation has not changed much) – the military, and the rent-seeking private sector.85 
The public sector employees have been especially valuable to the regime, above all in 
electoral periods when support for the party ensures promotions and job tenure. Other 
sectors like the military, businesses, agriculture and the public sector payroll received 
subsidies too. This fiscal stimulation led to an economic growth of 8 or 9 per cent 
between 2004-2007, which allowed a large increase in government contracts and 
nationalization of enterprises in 2007.86 
The anthropologist Pedro Sanoja points at an important sociological change in 
order to understand how the political spectrum has evolved in the country. According to 
the scholar, the poor, a formerly relatively passive population sector, became increasingly 
assertive in their demands in the 1990s as they progressed and climbed in the social 
strata.87 Their political strategies were much more disruptive than those of the middle 
classes. However, the political rulers largely failed to address them in contrast with the 
Bolivarian project, which adopted that agenda. And so, Chávez’s focus on the 
disadvantaged and rejection of the elites emerged as a direct reaction against the higher 
classes’ pacts which constituted the core of the country’s political stability.88  
In fact, this political division was a very clear line between the AD and COPEI 
parties which had alternated the power in Venezuela for decades and the new 
government. On the one hand, the former accused the Chavez administration of 
politicising and militarizing the state by placing supporters in key posts. On the other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Buxton, 336.  
85 Corrales, 70-71. 
86 Ibid., 70.  
87 Sanoja, 403.  
88 Ibid., 404.  
	   30	  
hand, militants of AD and COPEI dominated the institutions inherited by Chávez and 
held a rather obstructionist attitude towards the President’s administration. As a result, 
Chávez increasingly resorted to the promotion of loyalists in line with the development of 
the missions programs. The outcome was a displacement of those who had held power 
since the Punto Fijo Pact in favour of those who had been marginalised at that time, an 
important factor in understanding the high levels of polarization during Chávez’s 
mandate.89 And still, a sizeable part of the electorate was neither pro-Chávez nor against 
him but identified as “Ni-Ni”.90 
 
• The wheels of a whole compliant system  
The media is one of the clearest cases of how the regime has used the mechanisms 
at its disposal to crush the opposition. A 2007 study which was conducted by four leading 
daily newspapers found out that those loyal to the regime received 12 times more official 
advertisement than its competitors.91 The “social responsibility law” bans media from 
publishing information that could be considered against national security or disrespectful 
of elected officials.92 Penalties include prison sentences for criminal defamation, and 
exorbitant fines for libel, which were reinforced with the adoption of the 2005 criminal 
code.93 Along the same line, vaguely defined “incitement” penalties have been expanded 
and toughened, leading to arbitrary suspension of TV and radio channels, among other 
measures. 94  Similarly, the state has largely abused of its control of broadcasting 
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frequencies by threatening and punishing critical TV and radio channels and newspapers. 
The most blatant case was the non-renewal of the broadcasting license of RCTV	   (the 
oldest and one of the most popular of the TV channels in Venezuela) in December 2006 
for its critical coverage,. Although Chávez had publicly threatened to do so before and 
the government was not obliged to renew the contract, the decision was still shocking, 
even more so given that it did extend Venevisión’s license. Unlike RCTV which had 
continued with its severe tone against the Chávez administration, Venevisión had 
drastically reduced its opposition news coverage and lowered its criticism in the 
aftermath of the 2004 recall referendum.95  
Chávez had his own TV and radio show on Venezolana de Televisión (VTV), 
“Aló Presidente” (Hello President), a program which had been aired 311 times as of mid-
2008, equivalent to 4 hours and 21 minutes. The President used his show to communicate 
with his supporters, announce new policy initiatives, and of course challenge and insult 
his media critics and political enemies.96 His aggressive rhetoric became one of its most 
distinctive features. After the 2002 coup which overthrew him from power for two days, 
he adopted an increasingly adversarial approach against the private media, to which he 
started referring to as “the media enemy” and demonized them as “enemies of the 
people”, “terrorists”, “laboratories of psychological warfare”, “trash”, “immoral”, 
“fascists”, “coup-mongers”, and “liars”, among other things.97 They were accused of 
conspiring against the President and even of participating in the 2002 coup.98 It should be 
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noted that these same private media were forced to broadcast 70 minutes of free 
government publicity per week.99 
The state’s interference and undermining of the judicial system has been as 
systematic and flagrant as that of the media. Although Chávez devised an ambitious 
project to reform the judicial system as part of his electoral program when he first ran for 
the Presidency in 1998, things began to turn around only a couple of years later. As a 
start, the judicial regime was in very much need of an urgent and profound reform after 
decades of rampant corruption and political meddling that had made the system a deeply 
discredited and dysfunctional instrument. Figures speak for themselves: in 1998, only 
0,8% of the population had confidence in the judiciary.100  
Once Chávez took power, one of the first measures the new National Constituent 
Assembly101 took was firing hundreds of judges following a declaration of a state of 
emergency in the country. As a matter of fact, the judicial power has been in permanent 
restructuration since then, which in practice has meant political meddling and losses of 
independence.102 As a result, almost no judge who had achieved his post prior to the 
creation of the so-called Emergency Judicial Commission, has kept his post following the 
restructuration.103 The establishment of the Supreme Court, composed by 20 judges has 
been part of the reform process, initially perceived as an arguably fair and unbiased 
institution. Upon its creation, it was established that in order to protect the judges’ 
independence, two thirds of a majority vote at the National Assembly should be reached 
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to impeach a sitting justice.104 However, the Court became increasingly polarized during 
Chávez’s first mandate. Only in 2002, 49 decree laws were passed, intensifying the 
tensions between the government and the opposition.105 It was the first time that several 
sectors from the CD in opposition rejected the administration’s ruling and asked for its 
resignation. The Judicial Commission together with the Supreme Court suspended the 
public competitive examinations and ruled that provisional designated judges, which 
have the same duties as the nominal judges, would be of free nomination and at 
discretional removal from the Judicial Commission itself.106 The same situation occurred 
with the public prosecutors, freely appointed by the Public Ministry in almost 100% of 
the cases in a provisional status and subject to the removal of the General Attorney.107 
In 2004, the government passed the Organic Law on the Supreme Court of 
Justice, one of the most serious blows against the judicial independence of the country. 
The new legislation stipulated an increase from 20 to 31 justices at the Supreme Court 
which from that moment on would be selected by a simple majority vote at the National 
Assembly (before the proportion at that election was of two thirds). Since the governing 
coalition had a slim majority at the chamber, the new nominations radically altered the 
balance of the Court and ultimately of the whole country, since the highest authority is 
entitled to appoint the members of the local courts.108 The LOTSJ also eliminated the 
constitutional provision that established a single 12-year term for the judges and the 
impeachment process through a two thirds majority at the National Assembly. Under the 
new law, the members of the judiciary were subject to removal under “serious offence”, a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Human Rights Watch, 42.  
105 González, 96. 
106 Aequitas, 3.  
107 Ibid. 
108 HRW., 45-46, 49, 53-54 
	   34	  
provision that considered two mechanisms. The first one estimated that justices pending 
an impeachment could be suspended before the verdict arrived. The second one devised 
nullifying their appointments.109 In other words, the guarantee of justices’ independence 
was abolished. Indeed, since then the Supreme Court has become boldly compliant to the 
government’s rule: it has failed to respond to the separation of powers’ assaults, it 
avoided addressing the 2007 challenges that attempted to reform the Constitution and it 
has ruled in favour of the government in the TV licenses concessions of RCTV and 
Venevisión.110 
The consequences of such governmental torpedoing and the ultimate lack of 
independence of the judicial system could not be more distressing. Impunity levels are 
above 90% in cases of common offenses and up to 98% in those that touch on human 
rights. In 2009, from the 9224 claims where these were presumably violated, only 315 
(3.28%) proceeded as accusations.111 These alarming figures are widely acknowledged 
within the justice system itself. In a survey conducted the same year, only 5.41% of the 
interviewed practitioners estimated that the judicial decisions in Venezuela were taken 
according to law parameters and 14,93% expressed that they enacted their decisions 
following commands that were against the law and their conscience.112 
Corruption is so rampant that court cases against the leadership’s interests are 
literally dismissed, meaning there’s virtually no accountability for graft. Estimates 
suggest that less than 5% of government contracts go through any bidding process.113 As 
it has already been noted, patronage is used as a political tool to ensure supporters’ 	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loyalty and of course, to increase the politicians’ private fortunes.114 The administration 
also resorted to a law provision which estimates that revenues which exceed the amount 
anticipated in the legislatively approved budget must be placed in a special “stabilization 
fund.” Chávez deliberately underestimated the projected price of the oil, ignored the legal 
provision of the fund and consequently freely used vast sums of money without 
supervision. Figures rose to a 20 per cent revenue surplus every year from 2002 until 
2009, the year when this data was published.115  
Needless to point out that corruption has also reached the electoral mechanisms. 
The government has been under the microscope for allegedly engaging in massive voter-
registration campaigns.116 It has also sought to discourage opposition voters by creating 
uncertainty about the possible victory of their leaders. Through various mechanisms such 
as employing clearly biased officials who undermined the National Electoral Council’s 
objectivity or denying jobs and government contracts to those who had called for the 
holding of the 2004 recall referendum, Chávez intended to foster apathy, defeatism and 
abstentionism.   
The government has also pursued a very harsh line against dissident voices in 
civil society. Criminal investigations have been opened on unsubstantiated and political 
motivated charges, organizations receiving foreign funding have been excluded from 
international forums, and rights groups have been discredited and undermined by 
unfounded accusations of complicity in subversion, among other measures.117 Rights’ 
advocates have faced prosecutorial harassment under allegations of being engaged in 
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partisan activities or pursuing a biased political agenda, ultimately seeking to destabilize 
the country and oust Chávez from office.118 In fact, as happened with the antagonistic 
drive towards the opposition, the President also accused both institutions and individuals 
in society of backing the 2002 coup against him, or being paid by the “empire” (the 
United States).119 The President’s relations with human rights groups, which were fairly 
positive at the outset of his presidency, have worsened in parallel to the opposition’s 
successes and criticisms. This increasingly aggressive political tone is to be regarded in 
the context of a deteriorating public services’ system which has affected almost every 
branch from education and health facilities to urban services or public works.120  
The last important factor to be mentioned is the immense militaristic levels the 
country reached with Chávez as President. Despite no significant threat either foreign or 
domestic, Venezuela could be considered the most militarized state in Latin America 
while Chávez was in power. Not only have members from the army been present in key 
government programs and institutions, but military spending increased sevenfold during 
his mandates. Between 2005-2007 the regime spent $4.4 billion on arms imports, an 
amount of money with which 300 new schools, 19 superhospitals, 34 medical schools, 
and two sports stadiums could have been built. Chávez viewed the military not as a 
neutral guarantor of the Constitution but as a “guardian of socialism against imperialists 
and oligarchs.” 121  Notwithstanding the long list of anti-democratic practices that 
characterized Chávez´s administration, large numbers of the population were willing to 
disregard such factors as long as their economic welfare was secured. The current 
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situation where the economy is at its minimum levels will indeed prove how much are the 
citizens willing to support their government when, apart from restrictions in civil liberties 
and corruption, there is unprecedented violent repression and the economic well-being is 
only in free fall.  
 
• A government marked by instability  
Hugo Chávez was about to lose power three times only between 2001-2004 when 
he had been in the Presidency just since 1999: following the massive street protests that 
instigated the short-lived coup in 2002, the 2002-2003 general strike led by the oil sector, 
and the 2004 recall referendum.122 Along these years he adopted a more and more 
aggressive tone against his opponents and any sign of dissidence was persecuted, silenced 
and taken to the justice. Chavez made of the decree laws an increasingly common ruling 
tool, successfully co-opted and gradually coerced media, the justice system, and 
undermined civil society. The campaign against the opposition faction reached such 
levels that by 2005 it decided to take the most drastic measure until then: to boycott the 
National Assembly ballot hoping that the international community would back them and 
force the government to annul or postpone the elections.123 In retrospect this was the 
costliest decision as the government proceeded to hold the elections anyway and as a 
result, formed a chamber without opposition forces, which in the previous legislature had 
held 45% of the seats.124  
Two years later, the Chavez administration pursued to adopt a contentious 
constitutional reform that would have given the executive much more power, including 	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supervising the military; and the economy would have been controlled by the central 
authority of the government, conducted following common interests.125 The reform was 
rejected by a very small margin, whose result is partly explained because it was 
organized by a student movement, with a very specific purpose, and not by political 
parties.126 The internal debate that emerged following the failed approval was quickly left 
aside with the emergence of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV in the 
Spanish acronym), the government’s organization. Its slogan was “homeland, socialism 
or death.”127 Such political volatility may also be found in the government’s cabinet 
itself: between 1999-2008, Chavez had 6 vice presidents, 6 foreign ministers, 9 interior 
ministers, 12 secretaries of the presidency, 7 finance ministers, 9 ministers of industry 
and commerce, 6 ministers of health, and 7 ministers of infrastructure.128  
In 2009, the regime successfully held a referendum to end the term limits in the 
Constitution. Unfair practices were recorded at the next elections such as heavy use of 
public media in favour of his party or extravagant and illegal state spending. Some new 
tactics were introduced like aggressively calling to participate the chavistas who had 
abstained in the 2007 referendum, promising an indefinite mandate to all the elected posts 
and even arguing that the Venezuelan democratic system was strong enough without the 
terms’ limits checks and balances, and that elections alone were sufficient to provide 
accountability.129 In the 2012 electoral campaign Chavez defined himself as “the people”: 
“whatever you do and whatever happens you won’t be able to defeat Chavez because he’s 
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the people.”130 Previously he had identified the people’s voice as God131 and so he drew a 
trinity between himself, the people and God.  
 
• An opposition united only in its dislike for Chávez 
“Venezuela is a country where every day the opposition wakes up not thinking 
how to improve the situation but how to overthrow the government,”132 according to Ali 
Rodríguez, Chávez’s trusted lieutenant and head of the state oil company. This quotation 
is from 2002 and without denying its current value, the playing field has been so uneven 
in favour of the government that one ought to measure the opposition’s successes through 
that lens. As a start and as has already been explained with the pervading use of the 
media, the regime adopted a more antagonistic position towards the opposition after the 
attempted coup against Chávez in 2002, instead of aiming at reconciliation. The President 
pursued a radicalization strategy against his opponents by pushing them into extreme 
actions so that the public would be forced to take sides.133 Since then, voters have been 
targeted and persecuted by the regime as happened following the 2004 recall vote. The 
ballot was full of administrative irregularities that sought to impede it and was postponed 
for months until it finally took place. Economic and social disorders have successfully 
been encouraged in the areas where the opposition ruled.134 Because the Coordinadora 
Democrática (CD), the largest oppositional faction in Venezuela for many years, was 
composed by a significant business sector associated with the traditional parties, the 	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government has emphatically depicted it as “the right”. Chávez deliberately associated it 
with the Punto Fijo Pact forces, ultimately enhancing polarization.135  
Today, the Democratic Unity Roundtable (Mesa de Unidad Democrática in 
Spanish), a coalition of several liberal, social-democratic and progressive political 
parties, constitutes the biggest opposition force. The most charismatic and well-known 
figures like Henrique Capriles, Leopoldo López – incarcerated without charges for more 
than a year now – and María Corina Machado, who lost her certificate of election a 
couple of months ago, all belong to this bloc. In April 2010 the opposition issued a 
document in which they explained their principles and proposals.136 In it, they defined 
Venezuela as a state that claims for unity and in which frustration and discouragement are 
seen in the streets. They condemned the almost unprecedented power concentration and 
centralization in the country’s history that the government enjoys today, while at the 
same time it has disposed vast financial resources. They denounced the authoritarian, 
populist, statist practices as well as the unsafe conditions in which the population live. 
They expressed their discomfort with the government’s confrontational attitude towards 
the opposition and its use of insults and damaging remarks, as well as the personality cult 
enforced by the regime that arguably aims to consolidate a statist society. The document 
also denounces the flagrant violations on human rights and how the last decades have 
only witnessed a worsening in the living conditions and in the institutional sphere. The 
opposition considers that there are fewer opportunities than ever to make progress in the 
country and points out that millions of people continue living in poverty conditions. 
Finally, they call for a very much-needed unity in their estimation that a country cannot 	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have a future without everybody’s inclusion and Venezuela deserves to be acknowledged 
by its contributions.  
The Democratic Unity Roundtable takes the 1999 Constitution as the starting 
point from where to begin a new model for the country. They call for dialogue, 
agreement, and understanding in order to achieve it. They embrace the values of 
democracy, community spirit, equality, solidarity, and cooperation and they emphasize 
national unity above all. According to them, wealth is to be accumulated through effort, 
work, and meritocracy. Prosperity and entrepreneurship should be boosted. The state 
should safeguard the values of pluralism, tolerance, respect for popular sovereignty, and 
the liberties of thought and expression. 
 
• Chavismo vs. opposition  
According to the Real Academia Española (which could be translated as Royal 
Spanish Academy), the suffix “-ismo” refers to doctrines, systems, schools or thoughts. 
Giving a person’s name to it is to be analysed as a thinking doctrine with very high value 
significance and a remarkable degree of personal cult.137 Both terms chavismo and “the 
right” are Chávez’s creations since it was he who formulated them and gave them 
meaning through the presidential agenda.138 The former refers to a complex mix of 
heterogeneous contents, which form a system of ideas that has been evolving since 2004. 
In contrast, the latter, being delegitimized as “the right” has not articulated a unique 
system of ideas in exchange for the so much needed unity, an important disadvantage in 
comparison to chavismo.  	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However, without Chávez, both categories do not have the same meaning as when 
they were conceived. Instead, new identifications emerge: there are chavistas who do not 
identify themselves with the current presidency, as there are parts of the opposition 
whose corporatist element constitutes a civil and partisan bloc. 139  Moreover, it is 
incorrect to associate both factions with right and left when most of the political parties 
since 1983 have been placed in the centre in terms of ideology. It is interesting to note 
that the current government as well as the opposition in place today still keep both 
categories. On the one hand, “chavismo” is understood as Chávez’s legacy although 
because their heirs do not go in depth into it, they risk falling on deaf ears as has 
happened with the opposition. On the other hand, the opposition continues seeking unity 
and cohesion even in sacrifice of ideology. Just as they did to remove Chávez from 
power, today they are together against Maduro.  
 
• Do the Venezuelans have an option other than chavismo? 
The opposition front sees the current situation in Venezuela as their opportunity to 
introduce change. The fact that the oil prices have been in free fall for months now and 
that this constitutes the sole significant source of revenue for the country’s economy has 
put the regime in a dead end where discontent is only increasing among the population. In 
fact, the explosive economic growth that lasted for decades in the country in consonance 
with the oil boom corroborates Magaloni’s assumption of a compliant population with the 
loss of civil rights and liberties if wealth is secured. The current situation seemingly 
follows her account too on how a long-term economic crisis will make the population 
revolt against its government. As an ultimate consequence, and more and more plausible 	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as the economic situation increasingly deteriorates, the Venezuelan government could 
collapse as a result of the people’s hostility to it.  
However, there are two important factors that play in favor of the government. In 
the first place, the regime has changed the lives of thousands of peoples through 
patronage, distribution of resources and access to power and thus, even if the conditions 
are not good today, people do not know what would the opposition bring either but surely 
they would lose part of those benefits. Secondly, the broadcasted information is so biased 
and the playing field in general is so uneven for the opposition, that their message does 
not reach everybody nor does it have the same force as the regime’s one. Hence, the 
country lives in a spiral of distribution of patronage, a polarized society enhanced by the 
aggressive regime’s discourse, and an economic crisis that instead of being addressed by 
the government, is being demonized as a product of the American imperialism, the 
fascists and the right.140  
Under such conditions, the possibilities of a regime change in Venezuela do not 
appear very optimistic. And still, things are only worsening and Maduro’s administration 
is not precisely working to change them. Furthermore, the president does not have his 
predecessor’s charisma and the aura under which he took power nominated by Chávez as 
his heir has clearly faded away under the current country’s conditions. Similar to Erdogan 
in Turkey and Putin in Russia, Maduro has not hesitated in resorting to violence 
whenever necessary, as Chávez never did or faced the need to do, as happened with last 
year repressing students’ protests. Only between February and March 2014 more than 28 
people died, most of them as a result of bullet wounds in their heads, and more than 1,600 	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were detained. 141  The National Guard and the bands commanded by the regime resorted 
to shooting, abuse in the use of tear gas, destroying and entering houses and public 
properties, vandalism, torture, and raids in several universities across the country, among 
other measures.  
It is not to forget either that President Maduro won the elections by a very thin 
margin of a less than 2 per cent of the votes against Henrique Capriles.142 This means that 
half of the population in Venezuela was against Maduro’s regime at the time of the 
elections, and presumably is today, if the numbers are not even bigger given the current 
situation. Thus, even if the conditions under which the opposition plays are blatantly 
unfair, the possibilities of change are far from impossible. After all, the rationing regime 
where people wait for hours in long queues to get a package of toilet paper or prepared 
milk for babies have never been seen before in the country.143 Some even travel to other 
cities in search of products such as a bottle of oil, for which they pay a luxury price. Not 
only is this a dramatic situation but the regime persecutes those who dare attempt to buy 
more than what is allowed. More importantly, this situation does not distinguish between 
social classes and it has already reached unsustainable levels. Only time will give the 
answer to Venezuela’s future but one thing is clear: the mechanisms that ran the country 
only some months ago do not do so anymore, a fate shared by Turkey and Russia too, as 
will be analysed in future chapters.  	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TURKEY: A country still defining its identity 
 
“We live in a country in which the prime minister was once imprisoned 
because he read a poem but has hauled hundreds of writers through the courts 
during his time in office. We live in a country in which the BDP enjoys the largest 
support of any party among the Kurdish voters but has to back independent 
candidates because the electoral threshold prevents it from entering parliament. 
We live in a country in which Kurdish politicians and mayors have been imprisoned 
on trumped-up charges and are not allowed to defend themselves in their mother-
tongue. We live in a country in which Kurdish children are tried in court for 
shouting slogans and throwing stones. We live in a country in which journalists, 
writers and cartoonists face fines of astronomic proportions. We live in a country 
in which women are subjected to violence and are murdered in the name of 
“honour”. We live in a country in which environmentalists who oppose the building 
of dams that will submerge ancient heritage sites such as Hasankeyf and Zeugma 
are branded as “traitors”.”  
 
- Osman Baydemir on the current situation in Turkey. 144	   
 
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been in power since 2002 when, with 
an unexpected 34% of the votes, the party seized the majority of the seats at the 
National Assembly for the first time in 15 years. Years of rampant corruption from 
the previous government laid down the perfect scenario for the new party – whose 
AKP acronym stands for “cleanness” – to present itself as the needed alternative. 
Since then, good governance, sustained economic growth and political stability 
after three military coups in twenty decades have arguably provided Erdogan with 
the popular support to be in office uninterruptedly.  
However, after years of unparalleled Turkish progress in so many areas and 
being depicted both by the West and its Muslim countries as the model to imitate in 
terms of approaching politics and religion, concerns have been raised recently over 	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the cutback on freedom of expression, the mounting persecution of human rights 
activists, the uneven electoral playing field, and the increasingly authoritarian style 
Erdogan has been adopting in the past months in general.  
In the context of such a flawed performance one would wonder why citizens 
continue to vote for him, all the more so after significant waves of dissidence and 
disenchantment. Among these, the most clear episode were the 2013 street protests 
following the attempted dismantling of the emblematic Gezi park in the centre of 
Istanbul to build a shopping mall in its place. The answer to that question follows 
the Venezuelan case in terms of good economic performance which has raised 
living standards considerably and enlarged the middle class. In addition, Turkey 
presents a unique factor in comparison to Venezuela and Russia and that is the 
emergence of a remarkably important religious social group thanks to Erdogan’s 
late ambiguous non-secularist policies. Although the AKP party is non-Islamist, it 
has Islamic roots, a component afresh and shrewdly managed by the current 
President. This has led to the empowerment of this part of the society that until then 
did not occupy a relevant place but that because now does, is likely to continue 
supporting the leader that has given them such status.  
 
 
• Historic and political context  
 
The foundations of modern Turkey go back to 1923 with the establishment of the 
republic under President Kemal Atatürk. In 1928 the country was declared secular, 
arguably its more distinctive feature, by removing from the Constitution the clause that 
defined Islam as the state religion. The political spectrum in Turkey has historically 
	   47	  
cultivated parties from every ideology: from Kurdish identity, ultranationalists, pro-
Islamists, centre-left, to centre-right.145 Nevertheless, looking at the political life of the 
country over the years, it seems that the population is largely conservative - centre-right 
positioned.146   
Two features stand out in Turkish politics. In the first place, the military has 
traditionally perceived itself – and backed by the citizenship, which is important to note – 
as the guarantor of the state’s stability.147 Considered the country’s most respected 
institution, the army has launched three coups d’état (1960, 1971 and 1980), and has 
consistently meddled in politics during this time. Its support mainly comes from the 
urban middle class and the state bureaucracy, two of the most important groups in 
Turkish society.148 Secondly, the Constitutional Court has significantly interfered in 
politics too by banning several parties or attempting to do so. In 1998 the Welfare Party 
was barred upon allegations of going upon the principles of the secular republic.149  
From the ashes of Welfare emerged the Virtue Party, an organisation divided 
almost from the beginning between loyalists to the former Welfare leader, Necmettin 
Erbakan, and those more reformists. Upon 2001 when the Court decided on its 
dissolution, indicted of being the focus of Islamic militancy, two new parties were born 
following both groups. The Felicity Party, composed of the Virtue’s traditionalists, never 
gained much support, in contrast to the Justice and Development Party (AKP), today in 
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power.150 Once again, in 2008, this organisation was about to be suspended under 
accusations of undermining the secular constitution. The last episode occurred in 2009 
when the Constitutional Court considered forbidding the Democratic Society Party over 
alleged links to the Kurdistan’s Workers Party (PKK), an organization largely opposed to 
the government.  
As David Shankland, a social anthropologist specializing in Turkey argues, in this 
country “governments rise and fall, dozens of parties change their names or are closed 
down entirely, electoral regulations change, military interventions jostle with new 
constitutions.”151 Not everything is so unstable however. Elections have been held 
regularly since 1950 despite the army’s interference in politics,152 and in contrast with the 
many prime ministers that have exercised power in Turkey, the country only has had nine 
presidents – counting the pre-democratic Atatürk and İnönü. And still, Shankland’s 
synthesis embraces quite well Turkish turbulent politics.  
 
• Is Turkey a democracy?  
Osman Baydemir, a Kurdish politician, lawyer and human rights activist, poses a 
set of questions that ought to be considered when thinking about democracy in Turkey. 
Does the rule of law exist as well as an effective and impartial judiciary? Are the 
different identities, beliefs, cultures, and mother tongues recognised? Are the media free 
and unbiased? Are the people able to rule over themselves and participate in the running 
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of the Turkish public life?153 Whereas the answer to these questions is not openly 
negative, nor is it clearly positive.  
There are several factors that characterize Turkey as a very particular regime. To 
begin with, the military’s functions, as has been examined above, have largely exceeded 
those of safeguarding the country’s borders. Its interference in Turkish politics 
overthrowing up to three democratically governments elected in twenty years, under the 
excuse that the country was at risk, is a highly justifiable practice. Nevertheless, the 
population’s support constitutes a crucial factor in this case, given the common tendency 
of associating the military rule with dictatorships. In this sense, one of Erdogan’s most 
important achievements has been to place the army at its lowest political profile since the 
1950s,154 by setting it in a position that is subservient to the civilian authorities.155  
As a second factor, Turkey has largely been regarded as a model of state 
secularism, in the midst of a region that holds Islam inseparable from politics. Cengiz 
Çandar, a Turkish journalist and former war correspondent, offers a rather different and 
provocative approach. According to Çandar, secularism was born in Turkey following the 
French model, which highly influenced Atatürk and his contemporaries, especially its 
revolutionary Jacobinism trend.156 And so, just as the Catholic Church was presented as a 
threat to the French Republic, so Islam was supposed to be for modern Turkey. 
Consequently, the religion was barred, not only at the state level but in public spaces too 
by forbidding the use of female headscarves, for example.  	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Apparently, the tendency is reversing today and Islam seems to be imposing itself 
against secularists who have accused Erdogan of discriminatory policies. For instance, in 
2005, the secular President of the Yuzuncu Yil University in Van, Yucel Askin, was 
arrested and imprisoned for alleged procedural misconduct. This provoked the outcry of 
virtually all the university presidents across the country who claimed that the government 
was manipulating the judiciary.157 Five years later, in September 2010 a referendum was 
passed amending the Constitution so that the Parliament would have more control, not 
only over the military but also over the judiciary.  
Finally, the prospect of becoming part of the European Union has largely 
influenced and shaped the Turkish state. Kivanç Ulusoy argues that the process of 
reforming the governing structures in Turkey goes back to the 19th century, formally 
looking upon the EU in the 20th century.158 The idea was to evolve from a multinational 
and multi-religious empire to a nation-state by acquiring a modern administrative 
structure and a coherent national identity. According to Ulusoy, Europe became 
increasingly involved in Turkish politics by the 1980s, in two ways. It exercised direct 
pressure for the country to adopt European governance structures and roles, and it 
strengthened civil society, providing it with mechanisms to influence state politics 
towards reform and democratization.159  
Despite the initial enthusiasm Turkey showed upon accession to the EU – it 
constituted a major card in the AKP’s electoral program back in 2002 – the process’s halt 
has largely disenchanted an important part of the population, which no longer sees the 
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European Union as the (obvious) future they should seek. Opinion polls show that 
support for EU membership rose to 75 per cent in 2004 and sharply declined to 44 by 
2013,160 although that figure increased to a 53 per cent last year.161 In any case, the EU is 
losing leverage in Turkish politics. Only in December 2014, following EU criticisms of 
the deteriorating press freedom in the country President Erdogan replied with a “mind 
your own business” tone pointing at the last Islamophobic episodes in the continent, on 
which the EU should be focusing on instead.162 The divergence between both powers has 
been pointed as a direct hampering factor in the democratization process in Turkey.163  
The Western state model and the Turkish desire to imitate it, the place of religion in the 
country, and the exceptional importance the military has played in its history are the 
pieces of a complicated puzzle. Traditionally admired by neighbouring countries in the 
region and depicted as the ideal to follow by the United States and the European Union, 
today Turkey has important flaws that preclude it from being considered the democracy it 
sought to be. 
 
• The AKP: A 12 year rule 
Only by looking at the wide spectrum of political parties in Turkey, one would 
wonder why the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been ruling the country since 
it first won the elections in 2002. Juris Pupcenoks, offers a good answer. In 2002, when 
the party ran for the ballots for the first time, the population felt a significant disaffection 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Barın Kayaoğlu, “Is Turkey giving up on EU membership?” Al-Monitor, September 23, 2013. 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/turkey-giving-up-eu-membership.html#   
161 Jacob Poushter, “The Turkish people don’t look favourably upon the U.S., or any other country, really” 
Pew Research Center, October 31, 2014. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/10/31/the-turkish-
people-dont-look-favorably-upon-the-u-s-or-any-other-country-really/  
162 “Erdogan tells Europe to stop criticizing Turkey,” Reuters, December 26, 2014.   
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/26/us-turkey-erdogan-idUSKBN0K40U720141226  
163 Ulusoy, 379. 
	   52	  
for the secular parties in place, largely due to the rife corruption from the previous 
government. The context was the perfect breeding ground for a different option.164 The 
elections resulted in the first time in 15 years that one political party won the majority of 
the seats at the national assembly with 34 per cent of the votes. At the opposition side 
only stood the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and independent seats.165 Since then, 
Erdogan’s party has provided good governance, especially in the economic and foreign 
policy areas, possibly at the core for its constant re-election.  
Turkey has achieved unprecedented economic growth levels; inflation and the 
budget deficit have been significantly reduced. Also, the country has become an 
important source for economic investment for other Muslim countries in the region, 
namely Saudi Arabia – the Saudi monarchy announced in 2011 an investment of $600 
million in Turkey’s agricultural and manufacturing sectors during the next two 
decades. 166  In terms of social policies, Erdogan has advanced in women’s rights 
considerably – the country has improved its gender equality levels and positive 
discrimination was approved in 2010 in their favour, among other social groups.167 In 
2008, constitutional amendments were introduced in order for women to be able to wear 
headscarves at universities. However, not all the decisions have gained the same support. 
In fact, some have been quite contentious such as the government attempt in 2004 to 
criminalize adultery, a proposal that raised such controversy that it was finally dropped. 
Furthermore, the consumption of alcohol has been restricted more and more. Taxes have 
been increased 450 per cent over this product in the first four years of the party’s rule. 	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The government has legislated for cities to pass ordinances that ban alcohol if they wish 
to, and its availability in public spaces has largely decreased. Despite what one would 
think, the AKP does not appeal to Islamic norms but to the health problems that derive 
from alcohol’s consumption to justify this new rule.168  
The AK Party was founded following the ak word, which means “white” and 
“clean”, and which implied that the organization was untainted from the corruption of the 
past.169 This pun achieved relevance in December 2013 when a major corruption scandal 
broke affecting Erdogan’s government. In it, at least 34 people, including the sons of 
three ministers were arrested on charges of bribery, tender-rigging, and suspected 
corruption.170 In a clear political intrusion into the judiciary, not only have all the accused 
been released, but the Parliament also voted in January 2015 not to investigate the four 
former ministers affected by the case. This suspiciously came after Erdogan had 
reassigned hundreds of judges and prosecutors as well as thousands of police, accused of 
being loyal to his former ally Fethullah Gülen, today accused of being the architect of a 
complot to overthrow the government.171 The continuation of the corruption soap opera 
arose in February last year with the revelation of tapped phone conversations made public 
through Youtube. According to the recordings, Erdogan and his son were supposedly 
planning to remove $1billion from the family members’ houses and conceal it.172 Even if 
the scandal achieved unimagined proportions – two million people had listened to the 	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conversation only in the first day – there were no political consequences. President 
Erdogan issued a statement affirming that the audio was false and that was the end of the 
story.   
The scandals affecting the ruling party are nothing new. In October 2008 a trial 
started against the alleged ultranationalist Ergenekon group, blamed of being behind a 
series of attacks and of provoking a military coup against the government. The 
organization is said to be composed of terrorist paramilitary groups, the military and the 
police, NGOs, journalists, government officials, judges and politicians. Whereas there 
seems to be some truth in the case given the initial support for the trials, the worrisome 
increasing of suspects and accused – estimates of around 300 – has raised the alarm and 
criticisms both within and outside the country. The irregularities under which the trials 
have been conducted have only reinforced such concerns. Not only have secret evidence 
and anonymous witnesses been allowed, but episodes such as an Air Officer who 
declared that his phone was confiscated by the police and when he got it back 139 
contacts had been loaded, later used as evidence, are far from reassuring. Along the same 
line, cases such as the arrest of Ahmet Sik, an investigative journalist, accused of 
collaborating for the propaganda wing of the organization, quite ironically given that he 
spent much of his professional work to uncover the organization, has led to analysts to 
point at the prosecution of innocent people using the case as an excuse.173   
Within such a context it should not be surprising that freedom of press has 
become more and more precious in the last years with Erdogan’s tightening the grip. In 
2012, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), an independent non-profit organization, 	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published a report in which Turkey appeared to be the top-world country in repression 
against journalists, followed by Iran, Eritrea, and China,174 which became number one by 
the end of last year.175 Even more worrisome is the fact that one third of all terrorism-
related convictions in the world since the 11-S attacks have been Turkish, a number that 
amounts to 12,897, according to a 2011 study from Associated Press.176 The tendency 
seems to be slightly decreasing – in August 2012 there were 76 journalists imprisoned, 
down to 49 at the end of the year and to 40 by December 2013 – but still, the documented 
abuses during the processes are extremely alarming.  
As an example, Kurdish defendants may serve. They constitute a large 70 per cent 
of those in jail and are not allowed to speak their language at the court. The indicted are 
charged for covering the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) banned activities and the 
Union for Communities in Kurdistan (KCK). Almost all the rest of the imprisoned 
journalists have been accused of participating in plots against the government or of 
belonging to prohibited political parties.177 According to the CPJ report, these people 
were routinely held in prison for long periods of time while waiting for their verdict. The 
possession of certain books, documents or newspapers, as well as the expression of some 
ideas has been criminalized.178 Arguably unsurprisingly, President Erdogan has publicly 
menaced certain journalists179 and he even shut down Youtube and Facebook temporarily 
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last year.180 In other words, democracy exists for those in power but rights are not shared 
by everybody.181 Erdogan rules without room for dissidence: he is entitled to behave the 
way he wants given that he has the voters’ support. The voices of protesters, judges, 
prosecutors, opponents or Europe are just dismissed.182  
 
• On the path of becoming an autocracy  
The demonstrations at Taksim Square in Istanbul that began in May 2013 and 
lasted until mid-August, marked a turning point in Erdogan’s administration. The 
President planned to replace the emblematic park in the centre of the city with a shopping 
mall. Except that, as Suzy Hansen from the New York Times argues, Erdogan was not the 
mayor of the city and did not consult the constituents for their opinion.183 In fact, when a 
committee composed of municipal appointees, historians, and academics, unanimously 
voted against the project, he just dismissed them by creating a new one favourable to his 
plan. As a result, people from every social background took the streets to protest with 
numbers rising to millions. What began as a defence of a public space extended to 
demonstrations against the mounting government’s authoritarianism and the use of 
violence in the protests – estimates count up to 8,000 people injured. Erdogan referred to 
the demonstrators “terrorists” and “looters” and as a result of their action,184 today they 
are facing trials in comparison to the police’s impunity.  
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In her account of the Gezi protests and the current Turkish situation in general, 
The New York Times’ journalist points at the concentration of power as the factor that 
forges the current regime:  
Turkey’s biggest problem, its authoritarian structure, has little to do with 
Islam. The state remains a tool for accumulating disproportionate power, 
and when threatened, it sacrifices its citizens to save itself. If a prime 
minister can co-opt the laws and the media, and if a self-interested group 
can prosecute trials of dubious legality, and if the citizens have nowhere to 
express themselves but in the streets, then the state institutions are 
broken.185 
 
The country seems to be governed by the axiom “the people do not know what is 
best for them, but we do.”186 In Baydemir’s words, Erdogan rules according to the 
principle of subordination proven that he does not believe in real democracy nor in 
elections.187 And still, with such a grim picture, Erdogan has been able to switch 
positions and become President of the Republic, and continue being the effective ruler of 
the country despite its supposed symbolic authority. 188 The Constitution devises five 
functions the President is supposed to fulfil. 189 The document establishes that the 
President is legitimized to supervise the legislation drawn up by the Grand National 
Assembly and confirm that it is compatible with the Constitution. Secondly, he is the 
person designated to appoint the most relevant posts in the ministry of internal affairs, 
several senior civil appointments, and to propose prime ministers when new governments 
are being formed. Similarly, it is the President the person in charge of deciding the timing 	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of the elections. He may refer legislation to the constitutional court and, although he 
cannot propose new legislation, he has considerable power to intervene, to influence and 
to impede its elaboration. Furthermore, upon his election, the President ought to cut ties 
with any political party it would have previously belonged to, in this case the AKP.190 
Erdogan has publicly declared he has no intention to do any of these but rather to amend 
the Constitution – which dates from the 1980 military coup – in order to bestow upon 
himself more powers and effectively rule the country. It should be quite illustrative to 
remind the reader that to this day nobody really knows who Prime Minister Ahmet 
Davutoglu is, at least in the international arena, and it has been Erdogan who has 
continued governing Turkey since his appointment as President last August.  
 
• 12 years later, why is still Erdogan in power? 
Given the persecution and prosecution of journalists, the attempts of closing 
several social media, the partial judiciary, the use of violence to repress protests and 
deaths of people in the streets, and the loss of civil liberties and rights in general, why is 
Erdogan still in power today? Why and how has he been able to switch posts from Prime 
Minister to President with a victory of a narrow 52% in the first round? Two tentative 
answers emerge at this point.  
First, as has been seen throughout this thesis, Erdogan’s economic performance 
has been more than satisfactory during this decade. Turkey is today the 17th largest 
economy with a gross domestic product that went from $232 billion in 2002 to $820 in 
2013, according to the World Bank, and the GDP per head of population rose from 
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$3,490 in 2002 to $10,780 in 2013.191 In comparison to the inefficient and corrupt 
government in power prior to Erdogan’s arrival, the Motherland Party, the AKP has 
lowered inflation – from 18,4 in 2003 to 9,1 in July 2014 – and unemployment figures, 
also to less than 10 per cent, among other achievements. Whereas prospects do not look 
so optimistic – last year Turkey had the biggest current-account deficit in the OECD 
countries’ club and the lira has tumbled to around 24% of its value – citizens may regard 
this as a temporary crisis and await a better future. In this sense, it is not illogical to 
assume that if the living standards have largely improved, citizens will continue to vote 
for the party that provides for them even looking the other way when a major corruption 
scandal comes to light such as that of 2013, and important factors such as freedom of 
speech are curtailed. As it happened with Venezuela where economic welfare prevailed 
over other aspects, Magaloni’s theory also seems applicable to Turkey. The limits of the 
citizens’ tolerance are what remain to be seen.  
Secondly, an important sociological transformation is taking place in the country. 
The AKP’s Islamic roots have gradually led to an increasing presence of the religion in 
society. In Michael Thumann’s words, “Islam is coming out of the closet.”192 The reputed 
journalist and scholar argues that if headscarves are seen more frequently today in the 
streets it is not because the country is going through an Islamization process – in fact the 
proportion of women that wear them has declined from 73 to 60 per cent between 1999 
and 2008 – but because those women that do so are becoming part of the public life.193  
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Decades ago these “uneducated” and “uncivilized” people started emigrating to 
the cities but it has been now when the government has empowered them by giving 
public space to religion.194 Consequently, Turkey is currently facing a clash between the 
urban elite which has ruled the country for more than 80 years, and an increasingly 
influential Islamic class that demands its place at the central institutions. Needless to say 
that the old elite is very much aware of the arising changes and is not willing to 
accommodate to the new situation: “We feel that things are sliding from our hands, and 
we live in the fear that our children will see a darker future,”195 according to a 60 year-old 
translator from an elite family. The buoyant religious class is gaining public space and it 
seems that, except for the consumption of alcohol, they seek the same pleasures as the 
secular population. Women have made of their headscarves a fashionable garment,196 
Islamic bathing suits have become more popular, and subscriptions to Islamic 
publications have tripled in the past years.197 Logically, as it happens with those who 
support a political party that enhances economic welfare, in this case this new emergent 
class is likely to continue to vote for the AKP given that it is due to them that they have 
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RUSSIA: Tsarist and Soviet legacy in the 21st century 
 
“Everything was extraordinarily effective, but at the same time completely 
meaningless. And meaninglessness, having acquired gigantic proportions, became 
threatening.”  
 
-Alexander Dugkin on the end of “managed democracy” in Russia under Putin’s 
rule.198 
 
Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999 and promptly set about consolidating his 
control over opposition parties, clamped down on independent media, and arrested 
activists who contested his rule while sitting atop a kleptocratic political machine. The 
political Russian scenario could be synthesized by a state heavily invested in political 
monopoly. To achieve this, the regime’s apparatus and the dominant political party, 
United Russia, have been hierarchically subordinated to the central authority, and 
insulated from Western influence. With the purpose of ensuring this autocratic rule, the 
state has traditionally imposed high barriers to enter the political market, thus averting 
possible challenges. It has systematically coerced “non-systemic” actors following the 
divide-and-conquer tactics and it has co-opted loyalists.199 The vast economic growth that 
Russia has enjoyed for years due to oil and gas prices has played an important part here. 
As a result, the population’s good living conditions seemingly explain the absence of 
popular demands until very recently, which, together with the government’s political 
monopoly have ensured what could be defined as an authoritarian regime behind a 
democratic façade.  
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Despite all of these blatant anti-democratic acts, Putin has remained surprisingly 
popular among ordinary Russians. Recent opinion polls, following his invasion of 
Eastern Ukraine and the Crimea, find that he has 80 per cent favourable ratings. Why? 
Why would an autocrat enjoy such widespread support?  
The present chapter argues that Putin’s ability to continually grow the economy 
has helped maintain his broad popularity and prevent the development of a unified 
opposition to his rule. Nevertheless, while the President’s control over state apparatus, 
media, and patronage have helped to prevent the emergence of strong opponents, such 
factors cannot explain his broad based popularity. In fact, as a result of the on-going 
economic crisis in the country his approval ratings have waned for the first time. The best 
way to understand this surprising support is by looking at the ways in which economic 
growth impacts both ordinary Russians and other political elites. 
 
• How did we get here?  
Russia has been one of those countries included in what was called the transition 
paradigm. Because so many new political regimes emerged in different countries at the 
end of the 20th century, an approach emerged theorizing that following the collapse of a 
dictatorship a democratic regime was to be born.200 Reality has proved otherwise and 
today Russia is clearly not a democracy. Yet it is also not fully authoritarian either. Some 
scholars have defined it as a managed democracy, a regime in which citizens consent to 
the manipulation of the political scenery.201 Such systems hold elections although the 
results are more or less foreordained, there is political order and by extension, serious 	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political challenges to the executive tend to be absent or silenced.202 In the Russian case, 
after the 1990s’ uncertainty following the fall of the Communist regime, the population 
accepted to play the game in exchange for stability.203 
Hence, in order to understand the current political system in Russia one ought to 
look back at the demise of the Soviet Union and the transition to a new political order. 
According to Michael McFaul, a number of decisions taken in the context of the 
circumstances at the time and without a long-term perspective, have configured the 
current Russian regime. To begin with, political parties organized themselves only after 
two national elections to the Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies in 1989 and the 
Russian Congress of People’s Deputies in 1990. It is important not to forget that back in 
1989 only the Communist Party was legal, and although an amendment was introduced in 
the Constitution in February 1990 to allow other parties to compete, its inclusion came 
too late for them to organize and participate in a substantial way in the elections in spring 
of that same year.204 
In parallel, following the first session of the Russian Congress of People’s 
Deputies in the spring of 1990, the idea of creating a presidential office had emerged 
among the democratic deputies.205 In the Congress session of May 1990, Yeltsin was 
elected as chairman but only with a minimum margin of four votes. With such precarious 
hold of power, Yeltsin and his team envisaged the establishment of a presidential bureau 
that would strengthen his government and his position towards the Congress opponents. 
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It is important to note then, that the presidential system emerged in response to a concrete 
situation and not as a result of a well-devised strategy. In fact, the referendum, which was 
held in March 1991 and was approved by 69.9% of the population, took place before the 
powers of the president were spelled out and included in the Constitution.206 
Secondly, the generation of new democratic leaders was primarily concerned with 
containing communism and excluding it from the emerging system. Proto-parties formed 
following the amendment to the Constitution although they didn’t run in the elections.207 
The idea was that the new system needed to ripen first before holding multiparty 
elections and despite the call of democratic leaders to convene them following the 
attempted coup in August 1991, Yeltsin waited until 1993. By then, almost all the 
widespread spectrum of political parties that existed two years earlier, from liberals to 
social democratic passing by Christian-democratic, had disappeared. Yeltsin also devised 
a different timing for presidential and parliamentary elections, which consequently, 
hampered party development.208 
In March 1996, on the eve of the presidential elections, the possibility of Yeltsin 
winning again looked highly improbable. Because the probability of being defeated posed 
both political and physical threats to the leader, several options were considered from 
repressing the opposition and eliminating institutions to a coup d’état. However, they 
were all too risky. Therefore, the holding of elections, even if unfair, remained as the 
only possibility. Once the authoritarian electoral system emerged and continued over 
several electoral cycles, the price and consequences of changing the dynamics and rules 
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of the game became more and more costly both for the elites and the public.209 And so, 
the regime was born not as a premeditated action but as a consequence of the events at 
that moment, to be developed and enforced with time. The new system devised so much 
power and benefits for those at the top that motivations to promote change towards a 
more democratic regime have never been advocated since that would bring about 
accountability and losses of privileges.  
 
• No checks and balances on the President 
In Russia, the President is the most powerful political position.210 He is entitled to 
appoint the prime minister although the State Duma (lower house of the Parliament) 
needs to approve the nomination and if it rejects the candidate up to three times, new 
elections ought to be called. The President has veto power even though a majority of two 
thirds of the Duma and the Federation Council (upper house of the Parliament) can 
override it.211 He also controls the nomination of the judges from the Constitutional Court 
and the Supreme Court and has the right to issue decrees, although these have to be in 
accordance with the Constitution and the existing legislation.212 Such edicts have largely 
been employed to privatize oil companies, TV networks or nickel mines.213   
Such concentration of power makes the Parliament very weak in its functions. 
Indeed, political parties are highly irrelevant in Russian politics. They are only present in 
the State Duma with a 50 per cent of the seats. Furthermore, the government has never 
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reflected the political spectrum of the lower house Parliament.214 However, the Duma has 
traditionally worked as a check on the President’s mandate given that in order to pass 
relevant legislation he had to count on a parliamentary majority. Finally, the Federation 
Council is composed by chief executives of the regional government and chairs of 
regional legislatures. In this chamber, committees organize the internal work and 
consequently political parties are not present either.215  
The unimportance of political parties in Russia is quite significant and several 
explanations have been offered related to it. Michael McFaul points at two very 
interesting ones from different schools. The first approach argues that after seventy years 
of Communist rule where such a party was the only one allowed, the society was 
alienated against party politics. Moreover, because there was no previous party culture, 
there was nothing to resurrect.216 More radical than this account, the second theory 
depicts Russian history and culture as inherently undemocratic, consequently impeding 
society from developing political parties.217 And so, Russia is a combination of a 
presidential system with a very weak Parliament that gives almost all the power to the 
President in place.  
At the fall of the Communist regime, Russia went through a transition “from the 
failing yet still functional bureaucratic authoritarianism of the late-Soviet period to a 
flashier, more footloose authoritarianism that rests on selectively capitalist kleptocracy, 
the dominance of informal influence groups, a decorative democracy… and officially 
encouraged attempts to create a new and profoundly illiberal ideology with mass 
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appeal.”218 This began with Yeltsin in the 1990s, it was consolidated with Putin in the 
following decade and reinforced with the oil boom prices in the 2000s.219 In order to 
enforce this system, and to avoid potential challenges from the opposition as well as from 
part of the ruling group that may attempt an overthrow of the regime, the government 
resorts to a balanced system of sticks and carrots, repression and co-optation.220 It is not 
to be overlooked that an authoritarian regime needs to be enforced and sustained over the 
long run and for this purpose, a control of the bureaucracy, a coercive apparatus and a 
dominant party, in case there is one, are crucial. Finally, the regimes needs to face up to 
political changes if things go bad, or, at the other extreme, deal with political inclusion 
and rising expectations if there is economic progress.221  
What was born as a rigged and managed democracy to ensure Yeltsin’s stay in 
power was gradually enforced and perfected until it became the current regime in Russia 
today. Without any institution exercising relevant leverage on the President’s extensive 
ruling powers, his figure has been consolidated as the sole significant source of power in 
the state. This has allowed him to rely on a very small group of people that belong to the 
higher class to control the country’s assets, which produce benefits for the President and 
his allies. Once again, economic growth has ensured wealth for the ruling and upper 
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• Public resources for private gain 
Patronage and clientelism have been part of the Russian political system since 
medieval times and continue in modern forms today. The former refers to an exchange 
between a client that would offer goods, services or support to a patron in exchange for 
protection or other benefits such as the promotion of the clients’ interests.222 The latter 
was an important component in feudalism although unlike this system, clientelist 
relations were characterized by a much more informal liaison.223 In feudal times, the 
object of exchange used to be land that the landlord allowed vassals to cultivate, at least 
part of it, in return for the workers’ military skills, money or a share of the production. 
Today, the working class receives access to local transport, favours in the capital city or 
jobs in their living area, in return for votes.224  
This entrenched system endured in the Soviet Union where patronage continued 
to be omnipresent: the state was the main employer, it lacked the means to fulfil its 
promises to the whole population and it operated in an idiom incomprehensible to the 
great majority. 225  This system was formally established through the nomenklatura 
structure, comprised by the Soviet elite – almost all were members of the Communist 
Party – which had the greatest responsibilities in the state bureaucracy in exchange for 
important privileges. In fact, if a person wanted to climb steps in society, he or she ought 
to belong to the nomenklatura.226 In contemporary Russia, politics continue to operate 
following an unofficial mutual exchange of goods and services, in hands of the former 
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nomenklatura members. During the privatization process following the demise of the 
Communist regime, personal connections became more important than ever since they 
provided access to resources, information, credits and licenses. Today, favours are paid in 
cash, a combination of corruption and violence, sometimes also defined as mafia.227  
The machinery of the state, with its public goods serving for private gains and 
interests is indeed one of the most prominent characteristics in the contemporary Russian 
system, and the first one that enforces Russian authoritarianism today, according to 
Daniel Kimmage. The scholar defines it as “selective kleptocracy”, meaning a no 
distinction between high-level businessmen and senior officials: the latter occupy posts 
on the boards of large state-run companies.228 For their part, employers have to bribe 
officials in order to do business. As a famous Russian saying puts it, “the elites want 
socialism for themselves, and capitalism for the people.”229 
Kimmage then expresses that given that there are no legal guarantees for private 
property, the real vehicles of power in the country come from informal influence groups, 
which seek to influence the state’s apparatus in order to ensure their wealth.230 These 
clans are based on mutual business interests, corporate solidarity, and experiential bonds. 
Such groups, which have been managed by Putin from the top without allowing any to 
become stronger than the other, have become prosperous through these unofficial means. 
And so, the least they want is a more democratic and transparent regime, which would 
only precipitate their loss of power. Shrewdly, Putin never repudiated the latter or its 
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constitutional principles but he neither allowed them to form and consolidate.231 So in 
order to be a legitimate system even if its practices are not democratic, the government 
needs to perform as if it was and the holding of elections is its foremost mechanism. They 
are only façade given that the result is carefully controlled from above but they serve to 
establish national and international legitimacy and at the same time, the elite is able to 
extract material benefits during their time in power.232  
Additionally to the holding of elections, the regime has implemented several 
institutions that undermine the spirit of the constitution and benefit the ruling elite. For 
instance, in 2000 the territory was divided in seven federal districts, which were 
subordinated to the presidency and consequently, did not require constitutional approval. 
In the same year the State Council, a body composed of the heads of the different 
country’s regions was established with very similar functions to those of the Federation 
Council. Similarly, the Presidential Council for the Implementation of the National 
Projects, in charge of housing, education, health and agricultural projects, was born in 
2005. The institution clearly eroded the prime minister’s authority given that its activities 
run in parallel to the government’s. The Public Chamber was created as a body to 
supervise draft legislation and the parliament’s work as well as that of the federal and 
regional administrations, investigate possible breaches of the law, and issue non-binding 
recommendations to the parliament and the government on internal issues. These are all 
functions that are theoretically the responsibility of the State Duma, whose authority was 
evidently undermined with this new-born Chamber.233 As becomes clear, “In Russia, the 
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political order defends the privileges of the political regime, which in a patrimonial way 
itself became the organiser, if not the outright owner, of economic property.”234 In other 
words, “The Putin corporation does not exist to preserve, develop, and improve Russia, 
but instead, Russia exists to feed and humor the Putin corporation.”235 And still, the upper 
class is not cohesive anymore around Putin’s figure and the long-time taboo over the 
leader’s succession is now open.236 Ben Judah and Andrew Wilson, collaborators at the 
European Council on Foreign Relations, define the new era as “late Putinism”, expected 
to be characterized by “elite divisions, continuous protests, social pessimism and an 
increasingly unpopular regime.”237 The recent annexation of Crimea and the on-going 
war on Ukraine have insulated the Putin administration with fresh air by raising the 
President’s popularity to an unprecedented 80 per cent.238 Nevertheless, it is still too early 
to assess its steadiness and if Putin continues to be the glue that holds together the 
Russian operating system.239 After all, the population did not receive the announcement 
of his return in 2011	  enthusiastically, regarded as the turning point of his mandate. And 
so, the assessment of Putin being the best-supported politician in the country has lately 
been explained as the absence of better alternatives rather than the first people’s choice or 
following the perception that no challenge is likely to succeed.240 In fact, sustained 
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economic growth, one of the presidency’s pillars, is no longer provided and without 
welfare, disarray and dissatisfaction are more likely to emerge.  
 
• Cracks within the system  
The long-supporting elite is increasingly divided among those that want to 
transform Putin, those who are primarily concerned with protecting their interests and 
therefore want to keep things the same as they are, and those who would sacrifice the 
President in order to save the system.241 Some of the 1990s oligarchs242 whose wealth 
was amassed without Putin’s assistance are increasingly unhappy with Putin’s new circle 
of friends. Others are approaching state officials who, as a result of their high-level 
positions, have access to important resources and are less likely to remain loyal to Putin 
in the long-term.243 Therefore, because its rule is less secure, the government has shifted 
from co-option to coercion. One could even argue that despite the head of the state still 
being the same, the regime is changing.244  
Part of the population today considers welfare insufficient as a means to remain 
loyal to Mr. Putin whereas for others corruption and the administration’s failure to 
provide basic services have reached the tipping point where welfare gains are not enough 
anymore.245 Besides, not everyone is winning. The new middle class that emerged thanks 
to years of an economic boom in oil prices, users of the media and Internet, today feel 
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like losers.246 Putin’s presidency has been characterized by contradictory or incompatible 
policies such as the restoration of Soviet symbolism and liberal practices, which allowed 
him to reach very different social groups who felt that at least Putin accomplished some 
of his electoral promises.247 This has been possible because like his predecessor, Putin 
never joined a political party (although Unity Russia is considered the Kremlin’s 
organization), since such a decision would have constrained his future alliances. The 
regime has also clearly lost the support from the urban intellectual intelligentsia and 
within this group, some are even willing to demonstrate. Putin is trying to fight back by 
mobilizing the provincial areas but even these groups are increasingly detached towards 
the regime due to the system’s failings.248 
Part of this disaffection and increasing demands come from the Medvédev era as 
President. Medvédev was President of Russia from 2008 to 2012 while Putin became 
Prime Minister. The Russian Constitution establishes a limit of two consecutive 
presidential mandates and as a result Putin could not run for a third term in 2008. 
However, Putin has been back in the Presidency since 2012. While Medvédev failed to 
accomplish reform and modernization in institutions, investment, infrastructure and 
innovation, he opened the door to new ideas precisely with his unfulfilled promises to 
renovate the system. Together with the announcement of Putin’s return in September 
2011, the population’s animosity largely mounted towards the ruling class. 249 
Furthermore, the three pillars upon which an authoritarian regime sustains itself 
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according to Przeworski – economic growth, lies, and fear250 – came true in Russia for 
some time although over time have proved feeble.  
In the first place, the boom in oil prices which led to impressive economic growth 
in the 2000s decade run parallel to widespread support from the citizenship towards the 
regime. However, this loyalty was tied to the procurement of material benefits and not a 
perception of legitimacy from the regime in itself.251 The collapse in the oil prices, 
together with the EU and US sanctions following the Crimea and Ukrainian events in the 
past months have already had severe consequences for the Russian economy, although 
their political consequences remain to be seen. In fact, Putin’s geopolitical moves in the 
region have been largely interpreted as a distraction manoeuvre to conceal the population 
from economic difficulties the country is facing and boost his popularity, as indeed has 
happened.  
Secondly, the government has built up an effective propaganda system through its 
media monopoly. The Russian media conglomerate RT, before called Russia Today, was 
born in 2005 with an assignation of 30 million dollars, a ten-fold figure today.252 In 
November 2014, the government launched Sputnik, a worldwide agency whose contents 
will be broadcasted by radio and Internet in 30 different languages from offices in several 
countries. The Kremlin’s aim, shared by many other authoritarian governments such as 
China, Iran or Saudi Arabia who are also developing their own channels, is to counteract 
the Western’s predominance in the world’s media. These countries seek to give their own 
vision of democracy, undermine the international institutions that emerged at the end of 
the Cold War and that have served as a liberal backbone for the world since then, and 	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restrain the democratic reformists of the emerging democracies or undermine the 
integrity of the new ones.  
Together with the low demand among many Russians for other informative 
sources, the big picture has been of wide support for the regime and unquestionable belief 
in their messages. Thus, a great majority of the respondents defined the 2007-2008 as fair 
despite the widespread manipulations and fraud.253 Finally, following the axiom ‘better 
the devil you know than the devil you don’t know’, “the fear of potentially losing existing 
benefits and the population’s inherent risk aversion”254 has contributed to a sense of 
continuity in the regime, even among those who did not like it. Rather than fear in the 
sense of repression, which was probably overestimated, it was more this kind of 
precaution that prevailed. After all, the economic growth of the 2000s had allowed the 
regime to loosen its grip, and at least on paper, to guarantee individual and even some 
civil freedoms.255 The problem now is that because the Russian economy has been funded 
in oil exports, and benefits have been partly achieved through protectionism, the current 
crisis is posing a serious problem to the non-diversified economy of the country. The 
“energy superpower”, as the Kremlin defines itself, has probably realized that the fact 
that oil and gas account for more than 63 per cent of the Russian exports and 49 per cent 
of the federal budget, is not a matter to joke about.256  
So far the Russian picture consists of several elements. For years, there has been 
important economic growth from which a new middle urban class has emerged. 
Logically, their aspirations and ambitions have increased too, in parallel to a severe 
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economic crisis that is hampering their realization. Many of these educated people did not 
live through the Soviet era and thus are not motivated by Putin’s appeals to it, one of the 
President’s reference points.257 Within the oligarchy, many do not owe their wealth to 
Putin and have other contacts to which they are loyal. Even if the disaffection towards the 
President is not widespread yet, the regime has been clearly leaking in the last years. And 
so the next question ought to be: where is the opposition?  
 
• The opposition? Weak and uncoordinated  
The 2011-2012 protests called into question the status quo in Russia. The 
legislative elections in which United Russia won only a 49.3 per cent of the vote were 
largely documented as unfair and the results much lower than reported. The population 
said enough is enough and took to the streets. Sustained economic growth was not 
sufficient anymore, the regime’s propaganda was less effective with mass access to 
Internet and other sources, and fear was partly overcome by a bandwagon effect of the 
mass demonstrations.258 In February 2013, only one month before the Russian annexation 
of Crimea, 28 per cent of the population expressed a negative answer when asked if they 
would vote for Putin again and more than 50 per cent would not want him to be re-
elected in 2018 after three terms in office.259 Given the fertile ground for the opposition, 
one would wonder why it has so far been unable to capitalize on the growing discontent 
among the population.  
In the first place, there is no coordination between the different anti-regime 
factions. As an example may serve the high profile of the 2011-2012 demonstrations in 	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Moscow when thousands of people went out to protest, and yet, the high peak was in 
2009 in the provinces, which passed largely unnoticed. Those concentrations were rooted 
in social and economic discontent and uncoordinated among them. Such lack of a 
common front becomes apparent when looking at the opposition leaders in the capital, 
more political and ideological, and those in the rural areas, more focused on practical and 
local issues.260 There is no unity either in ideological terms within those who are against 
the Kremlin’s rule. Nationalists, socialists, simple opportunists, and a wide range of 
liberals only have in common a non-desire for more Putinism. In fact, the slogan in the 
2011-2012 protests was “Vote for anyone but United Russia”. 261  And so, despite 
substantial international coverage, broad support for the opposition comes only on a case-
by-case basis.262  
The fact that demonstrations have not coincided with the electoral cycles has also 
weakened their potential effect. Riots arose after the legislative elections in December 
2011 and the presidential ballot was to take place in March 2012, a too-short time period 
for a candidate to emerge and to be able to deliver a strong and unifying message.263 The 
repressive tactics increasingly employed by the administration have not helped the 
emergence of a strong opposition either. Today, the government anticipates the activists’ 
work and warns potential participants in mass protests of the negative consequences they 
may face, organizers are harassed or detained in advance, police informers infiltrate 
crowds, and potential gathering places are blocked beforehand.264 Arrests have been 
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made under criminal charges for spontaneously organizing meetings, some even taking 
place tactically after the demonstrations had ended.265  
Putin has also counterattacked by mobilizing pro-regime protests and creating 
organizational structures loyal to the Kremlin. This has been the case of Nashi (Ours), 
founded in March 2005, which grouped youths patriotically working for their country 
with a very clear message: “Putin’s opponents are fascists or traitors, Russia’s enemies 
are the United States and Russian liberals, Russia’s friend is Vladimir Putin.”266 After the 
2007 elections, the Nashi members were rewarded with higher offices or posts at the 
Duma. Furthermore, because fighting against the enemies is supposed to be a common 
cause businesses were expected to collaborate economically or otherwise be exposed as 
unpatriotic.267 The Kremlin propaganda has also played an important role in shaping the 
global perception of the mass protests and opposition leaders. The regime has created an 
image and succeeded in making it resonate in the population’s consciousness which see 
them as agents working for the “Western foes” such as the US, NATO or the West in 
general, and consequently liable to be arrested.268 Furthermore, they are even associated 
with the 1990s crises.269  
However, episodes such as the Pussy Riot female musical group performing at the 
Christ Savior Cathedral in February 2012 in Moscow,270 where they begged Mother Mary 
for her to save their country from President Putin, and which received international 
coverage, prove an increasing and alive dissidence. Three members of the group were 	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condemned to two years in prison, charged on offending the people present in the church 
at that moment, insulting the Russian Orthodox Church, and undermining public order. 
The court dismissed the women’s defence that argued that their motive was political.  
All together, these factors inhibit the opposition from becoming a strong force 
against the regime although in contrast with the early years of Putin’s rule when there 
were centres of opposition such as some oligarchs and the media they controlled, today 
the opposition is wider, deeper and more dispersed, which makes it more difficult to 
supress it.271 In fact, in the public opinion’s eyes, Putin is quickly shifting from “the 
president of hope”, as the provider of order, legality and justice, to the “despair 
president”, for whom there is no enthusiasm but is still better than the rest.272  
 
• What does Putin’s future look like?  
The current political system in Russia has its roots in the Soviet years, with some 
elements even inherited from the Tsarist era such as absolute decentralization and a void 
between the urban and the rural areas. After seven decades of Communist rule and 
following the chaotic demise of the regime in 1989-1991, the population mainly sought 
for stability and economic welfare. As long as individual freedoms were guaranteed, 
political rights were secondary. Such conditions were perfect for the emergence of a 
system under Yeltsin that favoured a few privileged and that would be consolidated over 
the years with Putin. The nomenklatura structure from the Soviet times is still in place 
and the benefits of economic oil boom have traditionally been shared out among the 
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powerful and untouchable oligarchs. With such a scenario, the regime has long played the 
game of depicting Russia as not mature enough yet to be truly free.273  
Nevertheless, Putin’s prospects today are far from clear. The President has been in 
power for 16 years since he first arrived to the Presidency in 1999, in which he has even 
switched posts with Mr. Medvedev from President to Prime Minister and back to 
President. Despite a divided and weak opposition, dissident episodes have taken place 
such as the Pussy Riot eruption in 2012. The economy does not look good and its 
prospects are worse. As Magaloni proved in her work on Mexico, the population is 
willing to overlook economic downturns if they do not pose a challenge to the status quo 
but the current situation in Russia has been going on long enough for it to be considered 
not temporary but as a long-term crisis already. Within such a context, Putin’s record 
popularity following Crimea’s annexation and the conflict in Ukraine should be taken 
with a pinch of salt. In fact, in the months prior to these events, the population already 
showed increasing dislike for him and in the future that should come back as soon as the 
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     CONCLUSION 
The global political spectrum is far more nuanced than a division between 
democracies, dictatorships and possibly those shifting from one to the other. The study 
cases presented here are among those that are not clearly identified in any way. Although 
certainly different in many ways, the three share an aspect that is frequently cited as the 
basic tenet of democratic regimes and that is the holding of elections. However, as this 
study has proved, reality is far more complex. While Venezuela, Turkey and Russia hold 
regular elections, they are commonly regarded as hybrid regimes. As a common 
significant feature, their leaders have been in power for more than a decade now – for the 
purpose of this study, President Maduro in Venezuela has been considered as a 
continuation of Chávez as he actually presents himself. This raises a puzzle: why, if the 
country holds regular elections, do citizens continue voting for the same leaders? Why 
keep doing so when there have been widespread dissidence episodes that have been 
violently repressed in all cases?  
A detailed examination of the countries’ regimes has brought up too many 
features that do not coincide with what is commonly understood as a democracy such as 
governmental judicial interference, restriction of civil rights and liberties, attempts to 
amend the constitution to stay in power indefinitely or else switching posts from prime 
minister to president or vice versa, undermining freedom of press, electoral uneven 
playing field which has sometimes risen to persecution of opposition leaders, etc. Such 
panorama offers a bleak scenario for change but what appears interesting here is that 
Chávez, Erdogan and Putin have won elections over and over with large popular support, 
even when the regime presented all those negative factors. Why so? The answer, 
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although not obvious at first sight, is simple: if the population is economically wealthy, it 
will overlook “secondary factors” such as certain lack of civil rights and liberties.  
Francis Fukuyama, in an article published in June 2014 in The Washington Post in 
which he reviewed his well-renowned theory of the triumph of democracy at the end of 
history, argued the following: “Democracies survive and succeed only because people are 
willing to fight for the rule of law, human rights and political accountability. Such 
societies depend on leadership, organizational ability and sheer good luck.” 274 
Remarkably, the last sentence seems more accurately applicable for the autocratic 
regimes object of this study. The three factors necessarily need to be present, intertwine 
and be skillfully managed by and for leaders to keep in power while still holding 
elections and thus exposing themselves to the possibility of an unexpected victory from 
the opposition. In other words, it would be nonsensical to assume that the regimes in 
place today in Venezuela, Turkey and Russia are inherently autocratic. Rather, they are a 
combination of their current leaders who are good managers, and the historical, political 
and economic circumstances in which they operate.  
In any case, Fukuyama’s conviction on the eventual success of democracy could 
arguably be a reformulation of the transition paradigm which assumed that dictatorships 
would eventually open up and gradually democratize. Twenty-five years after this thesis 
was devised, many of the countries “in transition” have indeed never become the Western 
desired systems and others have gone backwards in its democratic consolidation such as 
Nicaragua, Sri Lanka or Turkey. Recent studies confirm the tendency: since 2000 there 
have been 25 breakdowns of democracy in the world, not only through military or 	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executive coups but also through an increasing and gradual degradation of the democratic 
systems in place.275 Along the same line, since approximately 2006, there has been a 
significant halt in the expansion of democracy and freedom globally, oscillating between 
114 and 119 – around 60 per cent of the world’s states.276  
To sum things up, as long as a regime performs well economically, the country 
population will be (rather) complacent in tolerating other aspects such as the restriction of 
freedom of press, corrupted judiciary or repression of protests. However, the economy 
fluctuates and evidence has arguably proved that when the citizens do not have that 
incentive because things become worse, eventually those regimes face unrest and turmoil, 
as is happening today in Venezuela. Because the population has less or nothing to lose, 
insurrection episodes will be more dangerous and difficult to control and hence, put the 
regime at risk, with unforeseen consequences.  
Whereas globalization and technology are favoring citizens’ mobilization and 
awareness of the conditions under which they live and what the rest of the world looks 
like, by the same means autocratic leaders are learning how to improve their techniques 
and secure their power. Putin, Xi Jianping in China or the Ayatollahs in Iran are not only 
restricting freedom of press but they are also developing their own media to counteract 
the Western predominance, give their own view of world’s affairs and hence, have their 
own people under control. Moreover, democratic recession is crossing borders and 
reaching even the first world-power as it is the US in terms of efficacy, self-confidence 
and energy. The American political class has become increasingly polarized, corrupt and 
dysfunctional over the years, facing government shutdowns and having trouble passing 	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something as basic as a financial budget. Facing those issues, who are they to give 
lessons to the rest of the world? This is the argument posed by authoritarian regimes who 
take advantage of it in order to discredit the US regime and its authority. History has 
shown us that evolution does not equal progress but fluctuation, advancement and 
stagnation. It would thus be naïve to expect that the kind of systems studied here will one 
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